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Abstract: This paper analyses how racial wage gaps amongst women in the Brazilian urban 
labour market have evolved in response to a strong increase in workers’ skills between 2001 
and 2011. For this purpose, Melly (2005, 2006) quantile decomposition frameworks will be 
applied using PNAD data. In so doing we acknowledges a gap in the literature by focusing on 
women instead of men, extending wage decomposition frameworks applied to Brazil and 
updating wage gap estimates by using the latest 2011 data. Our conclusions thus coincide with 
Salardi (2013) in that increased female labour force skills are the strongest factor determining 
the reduction, albeit maintenance of glass ceiling effects. However contrasting previous findings 
by Foguel & Acevedo (2006) we find that the combination of higher skills, greater returns to 
those skills and changing unobserved factors drive, in conjunction, the lowering of racial wage 
gaps around the median of the earnings distribution. Finally our key contribution to the existing 
empirical literature in Brazil reveals that is has been mostly the combined effects of higher skills 
and unobserved economic wage structures which mostly explain the unexpected rise of sticky 
floor effects amongst women in the workforce.  
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Part I. Introduction 
 
Racial wage discrimination is known to be the primary source of inequality in the Brazilian 
labour market today (Leite, 2005). While gender wage gaps have reduced considerably since 
2001, having caught much public and political interest, racial earnings differentials have not 
fallen as much (Soares, 2000). Indeed, it was not until recently that discrimination in terms of 
skin colour was even acknowledged as a problem in a country where non-white workers, 
comprising 50.7% of the population today (Census, 2010), earn around 45% less than their 
white counterparts (Atal, Ñopo & Winder, 2009 and The Economist, 2012). This is a cause of 
concern; as it has been proven that racial wage gaps constrain prospective economic growth by 
producing inefficiencies in the market when moving resources from the most productive to less 
productive agents (Lang & Lehmann, 2011). 
Traditionally, racial wage discrimination has been defined as the differing labour returns across 
individuals, due to their race, who are equally productive and employed in the same sector 
and/or region (Loureiro, 2003). However this concept is now thought to be too narrow. The 
most recent strands in the literature hence reveal much more complex structures behind racial 
disparities in the labour market (Bailey, Loveman & Muniz, 2012). They account for this form 
of discrimination as the result of a combination of differing skill levels across workers (a 
Composition Effect), social associations due to skin colour stemming from the historical 
background (a Price Effect) and other wage and labour market structures (a Residual Effect) 
(Juhn , Murphy & Pierce, 1993). O’Neill (1990) and Juhn et al. (1993) theorized that differing 
human capital externalities in the form of these three effects underpin the basic mechanics of 
discrimination, principally so for women (Neal & Johnson, 1996).  
 
In the particular case of Brazil between 2001 and 2011, and despite the prevailing yet lowering 
racial wage gaps, the country has undergone one of the most radical economic and social 
transformations in its history. Inequality levels have decreased to unprecedented rates below 
0.55 Gini Index values; welfare levels have improved beyond any previous record by doubling 
GNI per capita1 and the country has established itself as the 6th largest world economy (World 
Bank, 2000-2011). Most importantly in the light of O’Neill’s (1990) ideas, there has been a 
great improvement in skills: On the one hand higher life expectancy, decreasing fertility rates 
and higher quality of life (Lee, 2003) have increased age expectations and consequently years of 
work experience amongst the population. On the other hand school attendance for under 5 year 
olds has doubled, 83% school attendance for 15-18 year olds has been achieved and access to 
                                                   
1GNI per capita levels from 6.82 to 10.18 at current PPP level. 
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tertiary education for whites has doubled, whilst tripling for non-whites between 2001 and 2011 
(Síntese de Indicadores Sociais (SIS), 2012). 
 
In concurrence with these increases in skills, racial wage gaps for women have decreased in 
Brazil between 2001 and 2011, as perceived in Figure 1. However, the interesting fact is that 
this reduction has not been homogenous across the whole wage distribution, which could 
explain why racial wage gaps are not falling as fast as gender wage disparities (Soares, 2000). 
For example we corroborate previous findings by Salardi (2013) and Foguel & Acevedo (2006) 
of falling, yet prevalence of glass ceiling effects amongst women A glass ceiling effect in this 
context is understood as the disadvantages encountered by a sector of the population to reach 
occupations higher up the job hierarchy (Morrison, White& The Centre of Creative Leadership, 
1987) : as perceived in Figure 1, there are rising wage differentials throughout the top half of 
the wage distribution. These differentials decrease considerably more for the 9th decile than for 
any other part of the wage distribution between 2001 and 2011. Moreover, from Figure 1 we 
also perceive the growth of sticky floor effects by 2011: despite the fact that sticky floor effects 
exist in 2001, their reduction is smaller across time in comparison to the rest of the wage 
distribution. Therefore they become more pronounced across time (also visible in Figures 5 & 
6).  We define sticky floor effects as the situation arising when non-white workers are appointed 
at the bottom of the pay scale and whites further up that same pay scale; even thought they are 
otherwise an identical workforce (Arulamplam, Booth & Bryan, 2006).  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
The purpose of this paper is thus to analyse the effect the outstanding increase in workers skills 
has had in the heterogeneous evolution of racial wage gaps for women in urban Brazil between 
Figure 1. Female Hourly Log Wage Racial Differentials by Year 
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2001 and 2011. Skills in this context are understood in terms of human capital as a combination 
of schooling and work experience following Mincer (1958). Our focus on the skill effects on 
racial wage inequality answers both to the theoretical and empirical underpinnings expressed 
above, together with the aim to further understand previous findings by Giles (2012). This last 
paper established that changes in education levels and racial wage gaps were the predominant 
factors in driving the reduction in poverty and inequality for metropolitan Brazil between 2001 
and 2009. 
 
By focusing on the issue of racial wage gaps amongst women during this time, we are also 
contributing to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly we are extending existing evidence 
on racial wage gaps which only covers up to 2006 in Salardi (2013). Instead, we are using the 
latest Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra dos Domicílios (PNAD) data covering from 2001 to 
2011; coinciding with the outstanding economic and educational improvements in the country. 
Secondly, our focus on women answers to previous shortfalls in the literature as discussed by 
Soares (2000). We believe a pure male-based study of racial discrimination fails to understand 
how white and non-white women are experiencing policy changes in the labour market. This 
has profound effects for current and future generations in Brazil, as much evidence reveals 
black women in particular to be the most vulnerable sector in the Brazilian labour market 
(Fredman, 2012). Their strong discrimination also has effects on the vulnerability of future 
generations, as greater education levels and equal occupational access for women have strong 
externalities on child survival and education (Hill & King, 2010). Finally, we make use of some 
of the latest quantile regression methods available today. By means of this contribution are 
reviewing previous assumptions of decomposition frameworks, to obtain new insights into the 
role that skills and their remuneration are playing in the racial wage gap across the whole wage 
distribution. In particular, to our present knowledge the application of Melly (2005) has never 
been carried out in Brazil. This will allow us to extend the basic Melly (2006) framework based 
on Machado & Mata (2005) and assess racial wag gaps on the basis of a tripartite effect 
decomposition.  
 
By means of these contributions we therefore aim to answer two questions:  in what way have 
racial wage gaps amongst women reduced across the earnings distribution between 2001 and 
2011? And how has a greater skill composition of the workforce contributed to this 
phenomenon?  
 
The methodology used to answer these questions is based on Melly (2005, 2006) quantile wage 
decomposition methods. Melly (2006) portrays the effects of skills in a multidimensional 
framework, differentiating between the effect of increased skills per se and wage structures. 
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Consequently we decompose the racial wage gap by year into the effects of characteristics and 
coefficients in each quantile (Salardi, 2013). Whereas Melly (2005) takes the analysis a step 
further in the essence of the Juhn et al. (1993) by decomposing wage gaps into the effect of 
characteristics, median coefficients and residuals within the quantile framework and taking into 
account heteroscedasticity in the error term2.   
 
On a final note, we are also aware of the limitations present in this study. Firstly we are only 
focusing on urban areas. Urban areas provide meaningful economic units, less based on political 
decisions and portraying a greater concentration of highly educated individuals (Bacolod, Blum  
& Strange 2007). Moreover urban areas are now the central setting for formal labour markets in 
the country, as they home 85% of the population (World Bank Data, 2011).  Secondly we only 
cover the period between 2001 and 2011. In so doing we feel this can portray in our model the 
effects of economic growth and educational expansion more accurately, without capturing the 
effects of the strong political and economic changes which took place in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Our period of interest coincides with the outstanding increase in education presented above and 
is, therefore, more relevant to the question at hand. Finally, due to the aggregate nature of  our 
model, we cannot include other institutional functions likely to  have  affected our results 
(Melly, 2005). However, we will discuss this issue in more detail throughout the course of this 
paper. 
 
Part II outlines previous research on racial wage gaps in Brazil. Part III reviews the theoretical 
approach behind the evolution of racial wage gaps across the wage distribution. Part IV analyses 
the data and variables used in the model. Part V discusses the methodology and Part VI 
comments on results which are concluded together with their policy implications in Part VII. 
 
Part II.  Previous Research 
 
Despite the shortfall of specific studies on racial discrimination amongst women in Brazil, the 
past 50 years have seen a rise in microeconomic level studies worldwide due to the availability 
of reliable micro-level data and the advancement in econometric techniques (Dickson & 
Harmon, 2011). These methodologies were mostly developed in the US and were later applied 
to Brazil due to similarities in ethnic composition and geographical size. Stemming from Becker 
                                                   
2 A large sector of the literature has worked at developing decomposition methods for quantiles which 
apply residual analysis; however most of it has been applied to explaining earning inequality changes 
across time. Instead, we are following Salardi (2013) to analyse racial wage gaps separately across two 
years. 
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(1957) who treated investment in education as a capital investment3, these studies have allowed 
for the analysis of the effect investment in skills has had at an individual level. In particular 
following Mincer (1958) by proxying skills acquisition with schooling and experience, a large 
strand of the literature has worked towards shedding more light onto the understanding how 
higher skill level and its return impact the distribution of income subject to differences in class, 
gender or race (Dickson & Harmon, 2011). Some of the most notable examples in the literature 
were developed for the US; however due to the very vast literature on racial inequality in Brazil, 
we will limit the literature review to work carried out in this latter country. Moreover this 
section will be organized based on the conceptual and methodological development of these 
types of analysis in Brazil. 
 
The study of racial discrimination in the Brazilian literature can be divided across three 
generations of scholars who exemplify how recent this phenomenon has been acknowledged in 
the country: The First Generation ignored the existence of a racial gap in the labour market and 
actually initiated their studies to exemplify the case of Brazil as a “racial democracy” as 
compared to other ethnically diverse countries around the world (highlighting Gilberto Freire in 
the 1930s) (Osório, 2008). The Second Generation however, recognized the existence of strong 
discriminating structures in the Brazilian labour market, attempting to highlight the national 
structures behind the prevalence of racial discrimination. Fernandes (1978) Telles (2003) or 
Garcia (2005) are notable examples of this group of academics. Finally it has not been until the 
emergence of the so called Third Generation of scholars who have taken on a more quantitative 
approach to racial discrimination by analyzing not only differing wage structures, but also 
historically reinforced differences in education or experience. This strand in the literature has 
thus gone beyond observed wage differences to embrace disparities across skills and occupation 
structures in order to determine why, despite political commitment to reduce wage disparities, 
racial discrimination persists in Brazil (Osório, 2008).  Langoni (1973) was the pioneer in these 
types studies. By means of a dummy variable based regression, he underscored differing access 
to property as a major contributor towards racial wage gaps. Following his work, Hasenbalg 
(2005) and Silva (1980) developed the existing conceptual framework regarding wage 
differentials by carrying out studies which separated pure wage differential effects from other 
skill composition differences across the population in the country (Bailey et al. 2012). 
Hasenblag highlighted the importance of historical discriminating structures, not just in wages, 
but also in the composition factors which determine those wages. The latter study by Silva, N. 
(1980) revealed that coloured workers in Brazil (both black and mixed) systematically earned 
                                                   
3 Becker (1957) carried out the first formal study of wage discrimination. He analysed why workers with 
the same level of skills, schooling, experience and productivity had different salaries according to their 
skin colour, sex or religion.   
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16% less than their white co-workers due to a pure discrimination effect4. Therefore by means 
of these studies, the understanding of discrimination was broadened to encompass social and 
historical differences across races. 
 
The application of economic techniques for analysing racial discrimination in Brazil has thus 
developed from this Third Generation of authors. Most of these studies have built on 
econometric models based on Oaxaca (1973) & Blinder (1973) wage decomposition technique 
and its extensions; portraying a complex structure behind racial wage gaps by breaking down 
observed differences in the labour market into the effect of skill composition and discrimination 
to its returns (Bailey et al. 2012). Noteworthy examples in the literature include Reis & Paes de 
Barros (1989) who determined that black vs. white wage differentials were not due to pure 
discrimination; as differences in educational attainment explained a significant part of the racial 
differentials in wages. They quantified that almost 50% of wage inequality in Brazil was due to 
educational differentials. Indeed education has been repeatedly highlighted as the greatest factor 
behind wage differentials, accounting for between one-third and one-half of the total observed 
inequality in the labour market across time (Barros & Mendonca, 1995 and Ramos & Vieira, 
2001). This evidence thus provides support for the use of a multifaceted framework, based on 
our arguments outlined in previous paragraphs. Soares (2000) is also good example of the 
development of multifaceted approaches to discrimination. This study decomposed racial wage 
gaps in Brazil by distinguishing discrimination in terms of pure human capital, different 
opportunities in the labour market and differential wage structures. The conclusion was that 
black males suffered a mixture of education differential and wage discrimination, whereas black 
females suffered these two consequences and also an opportunity differential in the labour 
market. Indeed Soares (2000) is one of the few studies in the literature of racial discrimination 
which places special emphasis on the differentials between black and white women. For the 
purpose of our study, it is especially noteworthy for the purpose of our article to note that 
despite white women suffering a pure discrimination effect, black women on the other hand 
suffer all forms of discrimination which are envisioned in the literature (Soares, 2000). Whereas 
Oliveira & Gonçalves (2006) extended this line of work, focused on women, highlight the 
important effect of both lower educational attainment and lower remuneration of this education 
for black women in response to white women; making this latter sector the worst off in 
Brazilian society. 
 
More recent work in this field has built on this past evidence and attempted to explain the 
changes and implications of wage gaps during the New Millennium, when the country has 
                                                   
4 Silva, N. (1980) reached this result controlling for a set of economic factors such as human capital and 
labour market characteristics. 
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performed outstandingly well in economic terms, while racial gaps persist (Giles, 2012). Garcia, 
Ñopo & Salardi (2009) found that wage gaps have been decreasing hand in hand with the recent 
economic improvement of the country, though racial wage gaps have decreased considerably 
less than gender wage gaps. Arias, et al (2004) embraced more recent techniques by taking into 
account the whole wage distribution rather than just the mean. Their findings distinguish 
different effects across deciles, where black males earn 24% less than their white counterparts in 
the bottom decile; a gap which increases to 56% in the top decile. These widening racial wage 
differentials would thus suggest the existence of glass ceiling effects for racial wage gap in 
Brazil and reinforce the need for the use of techniques which go beyond the mean (Soares, 
2000).  
 
Finally, an interesting fact revealed by most studies is that the unexplained change in wage 
inequality has decreased over time; becoming less significant for wage trends from 2001 
onwards. This line of evidence stems from advancements in methodology techniques previously 
framed and is of special interest for the purpose of our paper. Nevertheless, this result is 
controversial and subject to methodology. Arias, Yamada, & Tejerina (2004) find that the 
unexplained component of wage distribution is greater for higher than lower quantiles of the 
distribution, where there are productivity enhancing factors which are not captured in survey 
data, and which could explain a dragging effect of the residual on improvements in wage 
distribution in Brazil.  Cunningham & Jacobsen (2008), by means of a combination of the 
Oaxaca & Blinder and Bourguignon, Ferreira & Lustig (1998) decompositions look at wage 
inequalities across and within gender and race in Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Guyana. They 
find that residual inequality is the major contributor to overall inequality. Foguel & Acevedo 
(2006) perform one of most recent updates to the literature by expanding their analysis between 
1984 and 2005 following Juhn et al. (1993) methodology. They determine Price, Composition 
and Residual Effects played significant roles in racial wage gaps. Non-observables however 
played the greatest role in racial wage gaps during this time, except during 2001-2005; when the 
Price Effect also increased its role considerably. However these results most likely capture the 
effect of the drastic economic and political reforms with the country underwent throughout this 
time: trade liberalizations, hyperinflation, the 1988 Constitution or the IMF intervention for 
example. Finally, Salardi (2013) embraced the most recent decomposition methods in the 
literature by carrying out a comparative study of each of them for Brazil between 1996 and 
2006. To our knowledge this is the most recent update to racial wage differential in the country. 
The author confirmed the persistence of glass ceiling effects for racial wage gaps amongst men 
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mostly due to a Composition Effect; whilst gender wage gaps presented both sticky floor and 
glass ceiling effects, largely due to a Price Effect.5 
 
We conclude this section by highlighting that the development of studies on racial 
discrimination in the country has developed complex multifaceted frameworks around this 
issue. The latest strands in the literature have thus attempted to explain wage differentials across 
race in a quantitative fashion, distinguishing between skill differentials and their returns across 
the wage spectrum. Accordingly it has been highlighted that it is lower education attainment, 
access to inferior jobs and lower market remunerations to skills which shape and have 
maintained the racial wage gap in Brazil. However a large part of this gap remains unexplained 
in the form of the residual.  Despite a modest increase in studies on wage distributions across 
female workers, the focus on men has been prevalent. Therefore, understanding how these 
observed and unobserved mechanisms affect racial wage gaps across the wage distribution in 
the Brazilian female workforce remains a gap in the literature today. 
 
Part III Theory: The Drivers of Labour Income Inequality 
 
The consequences of discrimination in the labour market on development and growth are 
severe. As, stemming from Becker (1957), discrimination leads to inefficiencies in the labour 
market which originate from the reallocation of resources from more to less productive 
individuals in the economy (Lang & Lehmann, 2011). Consequently much research in applied 
economics works towards understanding what brings about and maintains wages gaps has been 
carried out in applied economics by building on the Mincer (1958) equation framework: 
 
݈݋ܻ݃ = ߙ + ߚܵ + ߛܺ + ߛܺଶ + ߝ                                        (1) 
 
Wage per hour(Y) is portrayed as a function years of schooling attained (S) and experienced 
(X),6 both of which are remunerated by ߚ	and	ߛ	respectively. The reason for proxying skill with 
years of schooling and experience is that Mincer originally formulated earnings outcome from a 
process where individuals invest in these two types of human capital (Lemieux, 2002). Any 
other factor which affects wage, together with unobserved skills of workers are portrayed as a 
residual component (ߝ) which has been determined to play a varying role in wage structures 
across the literature (Rauch (1993) Glaeser, Scheinkman & Shleifer (1995) Armington & Acs, 
(2004) and Moretti, (2004)).  
 
                                                   
5 Both Composition and Price Effect will be defined in detail in Section III. 
6Note that introducing experience squared addresses the non linear pattern of these variables in the data.  
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Consequently based on the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition, from this framework wage 
differentials are thought to be composed of three elements: 
 
- A quantity effect, determined by differences in the observable characteristics of 
workers. 
- A price effect, determined by differing returns to observable characteristics. 
- A residual effect, determined by the differing non-observable factors which determine 
workers earnings. 
(Foguel & Acevedo, 2006) 
 
Contrasting these ideas, traditional definitions of racial discrimination only encompass differing 
returns to workers with the same observable characteristics based on race;7 i.e. a price effect 
based definition: The expression money whitens is very common in Brazil, as observations of 
the labour market reveal that the higher the end of the wage spectrum the whiter the population 
seems to become (Bailey et al. 2012). However, despite the traditional idea of the importance of 
the Price Effect on wage gaps, growing evidence and the application of decomposition 
frameworks for racial wage gaps, have determined that quantity and residual components of the 
wage equation are also determinants of wage gaps (Foguel & Acevedo, 2006).  The former has 
been tackled in the literature predominantly as a historical lower level of education amongst 
coloured people; whereas the latter refers to non-observed factors which affect wages and are 
not modelled in the explanatory covariates of the Mincer Equation, such as family background 
(proxied by parent’s education) or economic structures (proxied by unions, trade openness or 
minimum wage) (Juhn et al. (1991) and Bourguignon, Ferreira & Menendez (2004)). 
Nevertheless, the conclusions as to the role played by each component in racial wage gaps have 
been subject to much controversy depending on the method, time period and even geographical 
location employed. Likewise it must be noted that the Price and Composition effects are not 
mutually exclusive: it is the combination of both factors in observed and unobserved skills 
which seems to drive wage differentials in the labour market (Lemieux, 2006).8 We therefore 
now proceed to analyse these three effects in detail and present stylized facts. 
 
 
                                                   
7 In terms of the labour market, this is perceived by the differing labour returns across individuals who are 
equally productive and employed in the same sector and/or region. 
8Most importantly for our second decomposition, under the assumption of stationary economic 
environment, the analyst can identify both the effect of both the observed and unobserved level of skills 
and composition of the workforce (the Composition Effect) and the rate of return to that composition (the 
Price Effect)in the evolution of the wage gap across time (Lemieux, 2006). 
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3.1 Changes in the Composition of the Workforce 
 
It is often argued that differences in wages stem from difference in skills across the labour 
market (Henriques, 2001). Juhn et al. (1993) also acknowledged that changing composition can 
affect overall earnings dispersion by increasing or reducing heterogeneity of observed skills. 
From this perspective, racial discrimination is thus not only understood as the consistent choice 
of hiring white worker instead of hiring an observationally equivalent black worker at the same 
wage (Lang & Lehmann, 2011). 
 
Many authors have highlighted changes in the education and experience endowment of workers 
as the major factor behind the rise in wages in Brazil (Salardi, 2013). Its importance is also 
deemed to be increasing, especially in urban areas due to a labour market that demands high 
skilled workers in greater amounts. These factors and not pure discrimination per se are most 
likely driving racial differentials (Acemoglu, 2003). As such, traditional studies of the 
composition of the workforce include the analysis of the age composition, educational and 
experience levels at a given time. 
 
Firstly, higher age is perceived in conjunction with higher earnings, as older workers are 
generally more experienced (Johnson, 1993). The age structure of Brazil corresponds to a 
country which is undergoing demographic changes at a fast pace: with an aging population, 
decreasing fertility rates and higher quality of life (Lee, 2003). This is reflected in the 
workforce, which partly due to the effect of longer compulsory education and partly due to 
population aging has resulted in a more mature active female labour force. Figure 2 presents the 
age composition of the urban workers for both black and white females which were employed 
the week of the PNAD survey in 2001 and 2011. It can clearly be seen that the columns of the 
population below 24 years of age have decreased significantly, most probably due to the greater 
affluence of women obtaining higher levels of education and thus joining the workforce at a 
later age. However the workforce 39 years old and above has spread out more evenly across age 
groups, increasing the amount of workers between 39 and 65 of age.  
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Figure 2. Age Composition of the Female Workforce 
 
Age Structure of Female Workforce 2001 Age Structure of Female Workforce 2011 
   
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
Moreover as perceived in Table 8 in Appendix 1, the average age by quantile increased as we 
progress to higher quantiles; which is consistent with the overall positive relation between skill  
level and wages per quantile in Salardi (2013). The average age per quantile also generally 
remained circa 3% higher for white than for non-white sectors of the population as well as 
higher in 2011 than in 2001. It must be noted that there has been a homogenization of the 
workforce across races as the 2011 white female workforce is on average 2-3 years older than in 
2001 and the 2011 non-white workforce is 2-5 years older than in 2001. This factor could point 
out at an increased maturity of the black workforce due to greater education and longer life 
expectancy. 
 
Secondly, average education amongst women has increased from 9.24 average years of 
education in 2001 to 10.74 in 20119. White women experienced a 15% mean increase in 
education across the workforce; whilst non-white women increased education 26% throughout 
the whole wage spectrum (PNAD 2001, 2011)10.  These improvements have been determined to 
exert an important effect on wage structures (O’Neill, 1990). Previously it was determined that 
the reason behind institutionalized differentials according to race in Brazil was due to the 
historical slavery based roots of this sector of the population (Loureiro, 2003). As a Portuguese 
colony, Brazil received almost four million African slaves during three centuries, which 
                                                   
9These figures are higher than men’s figures; confirming overall higher education levels amongst women 
in urban Brazil than amongst men. 
10 Figures obtained from PNAD 2001 & 2011 data. 
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together with powerful European colonizers set racial disparities as the base for the 
socioeconomic composition of the country (Heringer, 2002). A good example is the fact that the 
South of the country, composed primarily of European descendants is considered the rich sector 
of the country, whilst the Northeast, where the slave ports were historically located is the 
poorest sector of the country. Despite the end of the colonial period in the 1820s and the 
abolition of slavery in, Brazil has never carried out an active policy for racial equality as the 
USA did (The Economist, 2012). Instead, racial differentials have traditionally instead been 
disregarded in the hopes that time would bring equality. However, studies have pointed towards 
family and individual surroundings as major contributors towards education acquisition 
(Hanushek & Woessmann, 2010). This would therefore suggest that historical low quality and 
quantity of education for coloured population would have trickling effects for coloured 
individuals today in the Brazilian community (Ferreira, 2000).  
 
Despite the above, more years of education overall provides little information as to how this 
improvement is important in terms of the level of education actually obtained: as noted by 
Holanda-Filho & Pessõa (2008) and Moura (2008), years of education do not mean completed 
years of education nor completed educational levels; a distinction which is noteworthy in a 
country such as Brazil where levels and threshold levels exist. Therefore it is not important how 
many years of education one has per se, but how many education cycles they have successfully 
completed. As such, the table below has broken down the increase in the education level for 
White and Non-white women according to each education cycle.  Years of study are grouped 
into 5 groups by educational level: primary, secondary, tertiary and post graduate. Primary 
education comprises the first seven years of primary education, known as Ensino 
Fundamental11; secondary school, Ensino Medio, corresponds to 8-10 years of education; a 
Bachelor Degree comprises 11-14 years of study. Finally those carrying out post-graduate 
studies are present 15 or more years of education. Table 9 in Appendix 1 reveals increasing 
years of education the higher the quantile, which are around 1-2 years less for non-white 
workers with respect to white workers and also around 2 years more of education per person in 
2001 with respect to 2001 for all races and quantiles. Education differentials by quantile are 
lower for non-white than for white female workers throughout the whole wage distribution. 
However wage differentials have been smallest at the tails of the wage distribution and wage 
gaps have reduced considerably over time.  
 
Contrasting education composition across quantiles, Table 1 which presents the population 
structure by year of study, reveals a decrease in the number of women who only coursed Ensino 
                                                   
11 However due to ocular inspection of the data, we have divided primary education category into two 
separate groups, from 0 to 3 years of study and from 4 to 7 years of study. 
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Basico or less and an overall increase in women coursing Bachelor Degrees or higher. Our 
results show the considerable increase (from 12% to 22%) in of the number of black women 
with years of study equivalent to a degree (12-15 years of study) ;a figure which is truly 
outstanding. s. This confirms the facts published in the latest SIS (2012) report:  that a greater 
number of women are achieving higher levels of education today, especially so for postgraduate 
studies12.  Moreover, despite fewer white women completing only Ensino Medio in 2011 than 
2001, more non-white women achieved this level of education. 
 
Table 1: Composition of the Workforce 
 
 
 
Finally, within the Mincerian equation (Equation 1), skills are not only measured in terms of 
education achieved, but also by the level of on the job training (Lemieux, 2002). It is assumed 
that returns to experience follow a concave pattern where people with greater experience in a 
field will have higher skills and thus greater remuneration but only to a certain level from when 
                                                   
12 The SIS (2012) report determined that non-white workers increased their access to higher education by 
30%. However, although our number is more modest, (SIS) 2012 refers to the whole country, and our 
sample is only restricted to women and to those who completed the equivalent of 4 years in this category 
of education.  
Sample Size
White Non-White White Non-White
27115 22113 26730 27168
55% 45% 50% 50%
By Years of Schooling
Less than 4 2619 4595 1548 3051
5% 9% 3% 6%
4-8 8702 8736 5760 7508
18% 18% 11% 14%
9-11 1909 1691 1528 1956
4% 3% 3% 4%
12-15 9709 6020 11901 11773
20% 12% 22% 22%
16 or more 4176 1071 5993 2880
8% 2% 11% 5%
Note: Brasilia is exlcluded from the sample.
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
49228 53898
100% 100%
100% 100%
Summary Statistics for Women
2001 2011
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this pattern reverses (Lemieux, 2002).13  Years of experience for the female working population 
between 2001 and 2011 remained at a stable average of 19.50 years. White women had an 
average of 18.9 years of experience in 2001, a percentage which slightly increased to 19.5 in 
2011. However Non-white women had a higher average experience of 20.22 years in 2001, 
which increased to 20.33 years in 2011. The slightly higher level of experience for non-white 
women is expected and coincides with the lower level of education of this latter sector of the 
population:  Non-whites, on average, seem to be entering the workforce at a younger age. 
Similar patterns across quantiles are found in Table 3 of Appendix 1. This, together with similar 
results for Salardi (2013) on education and age patterns confirms the fact that age, experience 
and education all present consistent positive relationship between wages and human capital 
endowments (Salardi, 2013). 
 
To conclude this section, beyond observed characteristics of the workforce, it must be noted 
however that the Composition Effect also plays a role in the unobserved characteristics of the 
population. On the one hand it is known that individuals have different levels of skill, both in 
terms of education and experience which will lead them to obtain differing wage levels in the 
labour market. However authors such as Acemoglu (2003) extended this analysis to unobserved 
characteristics. The arguments posed by this article establishes that new technologies are 
complementary to certain skills which are specific to each education group, where certain skills 
are rewarded more highly in society today, and where such skills are imperfectly correlated to 
years of education. Returns to education are thus higher at the upper quantiles; a fact which is 
present throughout the tables in Appendix 1. This part of the literature therefore reinforces the 
need to analyse both the observable and unobservable factors in the traditional Mincer equation. 
Modern econometric techniques and detailed data have allowed for a more thorough 
understanding of these issues (Autor, Katz & Kearney, 2005). 
3.2 The Price Effect 
 
It is not only the effect of the composition of workers’ skills which determines wages in the 
labour market, but also how those skills are paid for (Juhn et al. 1993). Soares (2000) for 
example found that pure discrimination is the major factor behind wage differentials.  This is 
known as the Price Effect of individuals in the labour market and just as the Composition 
Effect, can be measured both for observed and unobserved skills (Lemieux, 2002).  
 
                                                   
13 It must be noted that this assumption excludes people who gained non transferable skills in a particular 
environment and which later on were not applied to a new job market. 
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The mechanism behind racial discrimination in the case of Brazil is clearly one where the 
market uses race to infer information about productivity (Lang, & Lehmann, 2011). Race and 
social class come hand in hand in this country:  the idea that social mobility may lead to racial 
mobility is a popular idea captured in the colloquial phrase money whitens (Bailey et al. 2012). 
Moreover the traditional definition of racial discrimination in the labour market refers to 
discrimination in terms of the Price Effect: differing labour returns across individuals who are 
equally productive and employed in the same sector and/or region (Loureiro, 2003).  
 
In Table 2, racial discrimination amongst women is clearly visible within all education levels; 
where non-white women with the same level of education consistently earn less than their white 
counterparts. However these gaps vary according to the level of education: wage gaps have 
decreased less for women below 4 and above 16 years of education. Moreover we can perceive 
higher wages per year of education across time, which have increased radically for lower 
education levels; particularly so for non-white female workers. Together with this evidence, 
Table 2 also plots average log wage by year of experience. These trends follow a concave 
pattern with higher returns to experience for white compared to non-white workers; returns 
which have reduced across time. 
 
Table 2. Wage Gaps by Year of Schooling and Experience 
 
 
White Non-white White Non-white 2001 2011
Average Hourly Wage by Years of Schooling  Racial Gap
Less than 4 2.35 1.86 3.88 3.15 21% 19%
4-7 3.09 2.29 4.46 3.56 26% 20%
8-10 3.3 2.65 4.25 3.82 20% 10%
11-15 5.85 4.16 6.63 5.58 29% 16%
16 or more 15.15 12.14 15.55 12.82 20% 18%
Average Hourly Wage by Years of Experience Racial Gap
Less than 5 4.06 2.51 5.52 4.42 38% 20%
5-9 5.28 2.93 7.57 5.48 45% 28%
10-14 6.58 3.22 8.37 5.55 51% 34%
15-19 6.89 3.72 8.73 5.77 46% 34%
20-24 7.15 3.66 8.85 6.08 49% 31%
25-29 7.02 3.56 9.15 6.09 49% 33%
30-34 6.21 3.35 8.97 5.64 46% 37%
35-39 5.22 3.6 8.02 5.30 31% 34%
40-44 4.73 2.78 6.38 4.20 41% 34%
45-49 3.59 2.56 5.05 4.07 29% 19%
50-54 2.89 2.21 4.80 3.71 24% 23%
Note: Brasilia is exlcluded from the sample. 
          Base year for real wages: 2005
          1R$=$0,5
Source: Authors calcuations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
Average Log Real Wage per hour by Education Level (R$)
 
 
 20 
Graphing wages per level of education and also by years of experience can help clear the 
patterns in wage differentials in Brazil. Figure 3 reveals that average salaries per year of study 
have increased overall during the period of analysis. Patterns of returns to education for both 
races in 2001 and 2011 are convex shaped with a greater growth at higher levels than in lower 
levels of education, thus revealing higher demand for skilled labour in cities. Moreover, 
confirming threshold effects analysed by Holanda-Filho & Pessõa (2008) and Moura (2008), a 
clear peak is discernible at the 9th year of study, coinciding with the end of Ensino Medio cycle.  
However despite most wage structures following similar patterns, it must be noted that white 
wage remuneration structures for 2011 seem to have changed slightly, still following 
fluctuations until the 9th year of study. However, for this group, returns fall before the first year 
of study and increase more notably around the 5th year of study. This change thus means that by 
2011, real wage differentials have increased for the primary education levels for the white sector 
of the workforce. 
 
Figure 3. Returns to Education 
Log Real Wage per Hour by year of study 
2001 
 
Log Real Wage per Hour by year of study 
2011 
 
  
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
Trends in log real hourly wages per year of experience, depicted in Figure 4, also follow 
patterns highlighted in Table 2. These patterns are concave (where returns to experience fall 
from 30 years of experience onwards), higher for whites than for non-whites and also higher in 
2011 than in 2001. This result coincides with previous findings in urban Brazilian labour market 
by Ferreira & Barros (1999). The literature explains this pattern is the result of a decrease in 
productivity for workers above a particular age, especially in terms of health and physical 
condition (Johnson, 1993). Contrasting with the returns to education, wage gaps are larger per 
year of experience than by year of study and just as with education.  
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Figure 4. Returns to Experience 
 
Log Real Wage per Hour by experience 
2001 
Log Real Wage per Hour by experience 
2011 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
3.3 The Residual Effect 
 
Finally, there are also unobserved components of the Mincer Equation (Equation 1) which 
affect observed wage structures. Although their study in the literature is still largely contested 
and subject to assumptions, previous studies have highlighted three major factors behind 
changes in the residual components of the original Mincer Equation (Equation 1). Namely 
omitted variables, institutional factors and measurement errors (Lemieux, 2006).   
 
Firstly, it is believed that education and experience alone are an imperfect proxy for skills in the 
labour market. This means that there are unobserved factors which also determine the skill level 
of a worker and are not captured by the original Mincer formulation (Equation 1), such as innate 
abilities of schooling quality. The literature has developed a large range of studies trying to 
control for this effect by introducing instrumental variables in wage equations for personal 
background (parent’s educations) or quality of schooling  (Bourguignon et al. (2004) and 
Ferreira, (2000)). Moreover, recent work by Florida has also made use of new datasets which 
measure skills in terms of demand and not of supply, although this part of the literature is 
restricted to the US for lack of data in other countries (Florida, Mellander, Stolaricl & Ross, 
2012).   
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Secondly, institutional changes are also determined to influence unexplained wage gap patterns 
in urban Brazil (Foguel & Acevedo, 2006). The existing literature in particular highlights the 
effect of 6 variables: antidiscrimination institutions, minimum wage, unions, open trade, skill 
bias technological change and economic growth (Lemieux, 2006). Antidiscrimination 
institutions have greatly developed in Brazil during our period of analysis. Based on Articles 3, 
4 and 7 of the 1988 Constitution, which condemns racial discrimination in the labour market; 
Lula and Rousseff’s governments have set specific political objectives and national institutions 
towards tackling this problem. Today, the government has two institutions which work solely 
towards lobbying and promoting measures towards racial equality: the Secretaria Especial de 
Políticas de Promoçao da Igualdade Racial da Presidência da República, set in 2003 
(SEPPIR), and   the National Council for Combating Discrimination, which became the 
National Council for the Promotion of Racial Equality in 2004. Alongside  these organizations, 
the Government has also set various legislative measures towards reducing racial disparities: A 
National Affirmative Action Program together with a National Human Rights Programmee both 
created in 2002, which condemn exclusionary practices and set quotas by race for work posts in 
the public administration and for contracting services by government agencies. Moreover, 
universities have established quotas  for non-white students, together with scholarships for 
diplomatic studies for Afro-descendant Brazilians (Fredman, 2012). With reference to effect of 
minimum wages, we confirm it has strongly increased from monthly 246,79R$ to 406,09R$ 
between 2001 and 201114. According to the ILO (2012), minimum wage is one of the most 
effective policy tools to reduce wage disparities along the bottom end of the wage distribution. 
However as pointed out in Table 11 in Appendix 2, our data reveal that the bottom decile of 
white workers and the two bottom deciles of non-white workers earn below minimum wage 
level  and they do not seem to have been affected by this measure. Adding to the fact that only 
around 50% of urban workers are currently formally employed in Brazil (Salardi, 2013), we 
conclude that the positive effect of minimum wage is most likely a strong determinant of wage 
gaps across race, which leaves out the bottom end of the wage distributions. Just as with 
minimum wage, trade unions are also believed to be a strong political institution which affects 
wage structures, particularly so for workers earning around the median of the wage distribution 
(Lemieux, 2006). In Brazil, although trade unions historically did not have much of a role, their 
affiliation expanded during our period of study (Arbache, 2002). Nevertheless, from Figure 7 in 
Appendix 2 we can confirm that the majority of female workers are still not part of trade unions, 
which are also known to marginalise the least paid and lowest educated workers (Arbache, 
2002). Furthermore the literature has reiterated the important role of skill-biased technological 
                                                   
14 Both values are expressed at 2005 values in Brazilian Reais, where 1R$=$0.5 (IPEA, 2001, 2011) 
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change and trade liberalization are in determining wages ((Katz & Murphy, 1992), (Krugman, 
1995), (Acemoglu, 2003) and (Di Nardo, Fortin & Lemieux, 1996)). On the one hand, skill-
biased technological change explains how a greater demand of skilled workers in the labour 
market due to higher technological advancements, leaves those with access to lower skill levels 
worse off (Lemieux, 2006). However although Figure 3 depicts higher returns to education for 
the top end of the wage spectrum, the increase in returns to education across time was stronger 
for the lower level of wages. This fact thus contradicts the original skill-based technological 
change hypothesis and confirms that this factor is not likely to be having an effect in our case 
study. On the other hand the economic theory behind the trade liberalization hypothesis is based 
on Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international commerce. According to this view, trade 
liberalization has led to the specialization in a range of products, mostly high skilled, which 
increased their price relative to low skilled products, mostly analogous to non-black sectors and 
thus induced greater wage differentials in the country (Krugman, 1995).15 Trade liberalization 
did have a strong impact on economic structures between 1988 and 1995, when Brazil carried 
out radical economic reforms with the instalment of trade liberalisation and control of inflation. 
However during the past decade, Brazil has not undergone particularly strong tariff cuts in 
comparison to the 80s and 90s and therefore also renders this factor marginal in our case study 
(Castilho, Menéndez & Sztulman, 2012). Ultimately, economic growth has also been known to 
affect wage structures. This argument is based on evidence surrounding the business cycle, 
particularly recessions, which affect non-whites more acutely (Juhn, Murphy & Pierce, 1991). 
Between 2001 and 2011 Brazil experienced positive but limited economic growth rates 
compared to other BRICS countries. GDP per capita ranged between 1.31% and 6.09% during 
this period and no economic recessions (World Bank Data, 2001-2011). Moreover Arbache 
(2001) found that the Brazilian wage structure was quite unresponsive to short-run economic 
changes. 
 
Finally, the literature has also highlighted the effect of measurement errors in the Residual 
Effect (Lemieux, 2006). Although this factor is likely to be present in Brazilian economic 
models, we will discuss further the conclusion and methodology its possible implication in our 
decomposition. 
3.4 Combining the Price, Composition & Residual Effects 
 
Based on the theoretical framework above, decomposition methods following the traditional 
Blinder Oaxaca (1973) decomposition technique thus divide wage inequality between  Price 
                                                   
15Acemoglu (2003) in particular theorized that emerging markets have undergone a joint process of 
technological change with product specialization through trade liberalization which could indeed portray 
this theory in the case of Brazil; which opened its borders in the 1980s. 
 
 
 24 
Effects (changes in the wage structure) and Composition Effects (changes in the wage 
dispersion attributed to explained components in the wage regression). However, the 
introduction of quantile regressions and techniques now allow assessing the whole wage 
distribution instead of the mean. This has led to deeper analysis of relative changes not only in 
specific points of the wage distribution, but also in relative changes across the whole 
distribution (Lemieux, 2006). From Table 3 we can perceive wage inequality was higher for 
white than for non-white female workers and reduced across time for both races (as measured 
by 90-10 and 50-10 percentile ratios), a trend which reverses at the bottom end of the 
distribution.  
 
Under the original Mincer framework and as developed above, the distribution of wages (ܹ) is 
determined by the distribution of human capital (proxied by schooling and experience) and its 
price (determined to be the wage structure in an economy) (Lemieux, 2002). Therefore the 
variance of log wages across the wage spectrum is thus assumed to be the product of the 
squared return to human capital (ݎ) times the variance of human capital (ܪ): 
 
ܸܽݎ(ܮܹ݊) = ݎଶݔܸܽݎ(ܪ)                          (2) 
 
Together with the variance of human capital and of wage structure, Mincer differentiates 
between the Price Effects of observed variables and other unobserved  economic factors by 
means of the third component to the analysis of the wage distribution: the conditional 
distribution of the error term from Equation 1, (ߝ) (Lemieux, 2002).  By means of an example 
whereby individuals with the same level of schooling invest in different quantities of work 
experience, Mincer points towards the fact that there are still wage variances within each skill 
category which are not captured in the variance of observed skills alone. This implies that 
variance of observed skills in the equation does not fully explain wage variance and thus renders 
the variance of the error term (ߝ) important16. In the particular case of Brazil between 2001 and 
2011, this would explain why despite such a radical increase in education, this has not translated 
in the same measure to a reduction in wage gaps. Therefore, beyond possible measurement 
errors, the fact that residuals vary across skill levels would imply that there are unmeasured 
skills in the original Mincer equation and other structures in the economy which are varying 
across these skill levels and affecting overall wage inequality (Lemieux, 2002). Past 
decomposition methods base d on the original Blinder (1973) & Oaxaca (1973) methodology 
                                                   
16Lemieux (2006) also points towards the fact that error variance is not only important, but also varied 
across the wage distribution, thus rendering the variance of ߝ heteroscedastic. Heteroscedasticity implies 
that the variance of the error term is not constant, but varies with levels of skill: residual variance is 
thought to increase the higher the level of education for example. 
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would thus be only framing part of the picture by not taking into account the Residual Effect on 
log wage variances. This idea was further developed by Juhn et al. (1991) who provided the 
evidence in the literature that USA racial wage gap varied partly due to an increase in residual 
inequality.17 Therefore under this light, racial wage inequality can thus formally divide wage 
variances into two components: “Between Group Inequality” and “Within Group Inequality” 
(Reis & Paes de Barros, 1989): 
 
On the one hand, Between Group Inequality (BGI) is the difference in wages between workers 
who have the same level of education and experience but are differenced by another factor: race 
or gender for example (Lemieux, 2002). Research on racial discrimination is thus normally 
studied from this perspective; where BGI is represented by the independent variables of the 
Mincer Equation (observed factors).  In Table 3 we perceive that ,comparatively, BGI decreased 
much more for non-white workers than for their white counterparts throughout time, except at 
the bottom end of the distribution, where observed skill dispersion reduced considerably more 
for white than for non-white workers. However its effect was much smaller than the former and 
also decreasing with time. Moreover, negative values for 50-10 percentile ratio in 2011 point 
towards the fact that inequality has actually increased for the 10th centile white workers in 2011 
in comparison to 2001. Non-white women in particular had lower between group inequality 
than white women, confirming findings by Salardi (2013) that differentials based on skills are 
higher amongst white than amongst non-white sectors of the population. 
 
On the other hand, Within Group Inequality (WGI) is defined as the inequality in mean wage 
which would be observed if mean wage across all observed education and experience groups 
were the same (Lemieux, 2002). WGI is portrayed by unobserved factors and analysed by 
means of the variance of the residual in equation (1)18. The study of WGI has recently taken on 
a greater role in the literature due to the fact that it has been widely proven that the 
uncorrelation of the residual with measured variables in the Mincer Equation is far from true 
(Lemieux, 2006). From Table 3 we can infer that WGI followed the same overall trends than 
BGI, however to a larger extent. This means that residual wage inequality has actually been the 
greatest factor contributing to overall inequality during the period covered in our model 
specification19.  
 
                                                   
17 However it must be noted that the Juhn et al. (1993) method for residual imputation within their 
decomposition is based on the assumption of conditional rank preservation (Fortin et al. 2011). 
18McCall (2000) went as far as including the residuals as independent variables in a two stage regression. 
19 It must be noted that, according to the number of explanatory variables in the model, the relative 
importance of BGI and WGI will change. 
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Finally together with changes in overall observed wage inequality, BGI and WGI; Table 3 also 
depicts the difference across races for all three measures in 2001 and 201120. Differences in 
wage inequality measures across races allow us to conclude that overall whites have had higher 
wage, coefficients and residual dispersions than non-white workers across the whole 
distribution. However non-white workers have had a greater dispersion at the lower end of the 
wage distribution. Moreover while overall inequality and BGI have reduced with time, residual 
inequality has actually increased. We can thus confirm that this is due to a greater reduction in 
wage dispersion of the non-white workforce compared to the white workforce.  
 
Table 3. Observed and Residual Inequality  
 
 
 
To conclude this section, theory has determined that it has been a mixture of Composition, Price 
and Residual Effects which have determined the pattern of female wage gaps throughout the 
past decade (Juhn et al. 1993). Assessing the wage gaps in a framework which takes into 
account the whole wage distribution instead of just the mean allows determining how the 
reductions in racial wage differentials have changed relatively across different points of the 
wage distribution (Lemieux, 2002). In this light we have analysed how patterns in WGI and 
BGI have affected racial wage gaps across different wage percentiles. All measures of 
dispersion are higher for whites than for non-whites at the top end of the spectrum; yet they are 
                                                   
20 Residual wage inequality was computed following Autor, Katz & Kearney (2008). Trends in residual 
inequalities were obtained by fitting the following model by sample and year: 
݈݊ݓ௜ = ߙ௜ + ݏ௜ + ݔ௜ + (ݏ௜ × ݔ௜) + ߝ௜ 
ݓ௜is real hourly wages, ݏ௜ is a vector of five schooling completion categories, ݔ௜ is a vector of thirteen 
experience categories ranging between 0 and 58 years in 5 year increments,	ߝ௜ is an error term. Finally the 
inclusion of (ݏ௜ × ݔ௜) provides a very flexible wage equation (Autor et al. 2008). 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
90-10 2.24 1.88 1.71 1.54 0.53 0.34
90-50 1.37 1.28 0.89 0.89 0.48 0.39
50-10 0.86 0.60 0.81 0.65 0.05 -0.05
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
90-10 2.09 1.77 1.71 1.49 0.38 0.28
90-50 1.11 1.05 0.86 0.78 0.25 0.27
50-10 0.99 0.71 0.85 0.70 0.14 0.01
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
90-10 14.64 11.34 -0.34 5.77 14.99 5.57
90-50 27.03 22.77 3.71 10.72 23.31 12.05
50-10 -13.31 -11.42 -4.06 -4.94 -9.25 -6.48
Note: Racial Inequality Gaps were computed by the formula (white_ineq-nonwhite_ineq)*100
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
Non-white Women
Racial Inequality Gaps
Wage Inequality
Overall Wage Inequality Within Inequality Between Inequality
White Women
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also higher for non-whites than for whites at the bottom end. In determining overall inequality, 
WGI has played a greater role than BGI. Despite the fact that racial differentials of overall wage 
inequality have reduced across time, racial differentials for residual inequality have actually 
increased. This means that unobserved factors are thus promoting wage dispersion for sectors of 
the population with lower wage inequalities, inequalities that  are not being targeted 
appropriately. 
 
The next sections will allow us to disentangle the contribution of the Composition, Price and 
Residual Effects to the reduction in racial wage gaps amongst women in Brazil between 2001 
and 2011. 
 
Part IV. Data 
 
The data used for the model is composed of two cross section data bases provided by PNAD for 
the years 2001 and 2011. Due to the nature of the data, it is impossible to follow individuals 
across time; therefore quantile regressions will allow us to follow quantiles and their evolution 
instead. Moreover, we have restricted the sample to working women between the ages of 14 and 
65.  
 
The surveys cover 100,000 households per year in urban areas from 26 Federal States, where 
the city of Brasília is left out due to the strong bias arising from public sector wages (Salardi, 
2013).  PNAD is a multipurpose survey which is greatly used in the literature for its high quality 
data and ample coverage of variables including education, migration, fertility, income, earnings, 
housing and household access to services and facilities, making special emphasis on the 
country’s participation in the labour market. The survey was first carried out in 1967 and the 
latest covers 2011, conducted yearly except for census years and 1994. Most importantly, as it 
has kept its main structure since 1976, it allows for long term comparisons with minimum 
comparability issues (Ravallion, Ferreira & Leite, 2010). In our case, the only variables which 
required recoding were education and work occupation, due to a slight modification in the 
grouping of both variables. Otherwise all variables were coded in the same way throughout both 
surveys. 
 
However as in most surveys, there are drawbacks to our data. PNAD reports race and 
socioeconomic status by self-reporting, thus possibly suffering from endogeneity bias and self-
selection (Bailey et al. 2012). It is also known to underreport income, which is self-reported, 
both at high and low income levels. Moreover, due to the lack of panel surveys in Brazil, the 
data presented is cross-sectional micro-data, fielded every September and carried out in three 
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sampling stages (Da Mata,  Deichmann, Henderson, Lall & Wang, 2007). Other national 
datasets such as Pesquisa de Orçamentos-Familiares (POF) and the PPV survey are available 
and are widely used for Brazilian household-level analysis. Nevertheless PPV seems incomplete 
for the purpose of this study and POF carried out sampling at wider time intervals than was 
required; therefore PNAD seemed more appropriate for the purpose of this paper (Ferreira, 
2000). Misinterpretations are also quite frequent amongst participants due to the format of the 
questionnaire and also due to the low reading skills of some sectors of the population (Ferreira, 
2000). Finally, PNAD does not count with any measure of post-tax earnings, so all studies carry 
out income based analysis using gross earnings before taxes and without equivalence scales 
(Deaton, 1997).  
4.1 Variables to be used 
 
The total number of observations used in this study added up to 103126 throughout the two 
years. An analysis of outliers was carried out and 4 variables dropped due to unlikely level of 
wages per hour21. Ultimately the variables used for the purpose of this paper comprise 
socioeconomic characteristics of individuals above 14 years of age who have reported to be 
earning a salary in PNAD 2001 or PNAD 2011 including: 
 
Wage per Hour 
For the purpose of this paper, a variable for hourly wages  was created from both data sets, with 
information on monthly wages and monthly hours worked for the individual’s main job22. 
Wages comprise monetary payment of each individual aged 14 and over in every job 
performed23. The reason for using 14 year olds instead of 16 (which  is the legal age to start 
working in the country) is due to the existence of apprenticeship periods in the country as from 
the age of 14 (ILO, 2009). Hours worked was transformed from a reported measure of weekly 
hours worked in the week of the survey to monthly, by multiplying by 4. For comparability 
across years, all quantities were set based using 2005 consumer price index measures from  
OECD. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
21 These observations declared log hourly earnings over 800R$ and did not carry out job descriptions 
which fitted these high wages, namely administrators and school teachers. Their omission does not alter 
results much but does indeed smooth the upper section of the wage distribution. 
22PNAD also includes variables for earnings from all jobs and household earnings. 
23 Wages are only reported in monthly form; we are thus aware of possible measurement errors arising 
from possible errors in reporting hours worked. 
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Education 
Education is measured in years of education24 from 1 (less than one year of education) to 16 
(equal to 15 or more years of education); as provided by the PNAD database.  Education 
categories were built based on completion of education levels as described in section 2. 
 
Experience 
Due to the fact that there is no direct measure of work experience in our sample, this variable is 
built by the following expression following Ferreira &  Barros (1999): 
 
ܧݔ݌ = ܽ݃݁ − ݕ݁ܽݎݏ	݋݂	݁݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݊ − 6            (3) 
 
The reason for subtracting 6 is that children start compulsory education at this age; thus it is 
assumed children below this age cannot be part of the workforce. Experience has been modelled 
in single and quadratic forms, to capture changing returns to scale across the wage distribution, 
as perceived in Figure 4. 
 
Race 
The sample is divided by race, selecting only individuals who are either reported to be white, 
black or mixed. A dummy variable for white was generated with value 1 if white and 0 if not 
white; whereas due to the model specifications requiring the selecting variable to be bivariate 
dummy, black and mixed were grouped together as “non white”. For the purpose of this 
analysis we will thus not include those who are Asian nor indigenous. Asians have been 
grouped with white citizens in previous studies such as in Soares (2000); however this sector of 
the population only represents 1% of the total Brazilian population (Census, 2010). Indigenous 
population has previously been included in “non-white” categories. However, we did not deem 
this to be appropriate for our analysis for two main reasons:  the indigenous population has very 
different historical roots to the black and mixed population25, and  in urban areas this racial 
group  is a very small minority of the population (less than 0.5% of the population) (Census, 
2010). 
 
 
 
                                                   
24 We are aware other measures of education such as – level of education completed – are more 
appropriate measures of education. The fact that you coursed a year of education provides no guarantee 
that the year was completed successfully. However quality of data for our variable used was far superior 
and thus chosen above other measures. 
25Due to the fact that quantile analysis covers not only a pure ethnicity, but also social dimensions which 
have historical roots, we feel that including indigenous as “non –white” could potentially distort results. 
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Occupation 
In order to address possible issues arising from omitted variable bias and sample selection bias, 
Appendix 5 presents the Melly (2005, 2006) decomposition framework including occupation 
categories. This variable was built on the four occupational categories reported in PNAD: 
Employee, domestic worker, self employed and employer. Each of the four categories was then 
presented as an independent dummy with value 1 if the individual belonged to the particular 
occupation and 0 if otherwise. We note that all individuals who reported wages also reported 
belonging to one of these four occupation categories. 
 
Part V. Methodology 
 
Traditional studies of wage inequality have focused on the mean by building the Oaxaca (1973) 
and Blinder (1973) model. However, it is known that different measures of inequality yield 
varying results depending on the part of the wage distribution on which more weight is put. 
Accordingly, a growing number of methods have extended the traditional Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) model in order to account for the whole wage distribution as well as the 
distribution of the residuals (Melly, 2005). 
 
The methodology used for this paper will be based on Melly (2005,2006); who  based on Juhn, 
et al (1993), developed a semiparametric quantile regression technique26 where the conditional 
distribution is integrated to obtain the unconditional distribution. The objective is thus to study 
the changes in the whole distribution of wages27. The reason for extending the analysis beyond 
the mean in the quantile regression model is twofold. Firstly it offers a more flexible model for 
heterogeneous data at various points of the conditional earnings distribution.  It is useful to 
investigate whether the effect of race differs according to an individual’s position across the 
distribution of income after controlling for the segmentation of the labour market and other 
individual characteristics (Bailey et al. 2012). Furthermore as the characteristics are allowed to 
influence the whole conditional distribution of ܻ. Any measures of inequality can be used to 
decompose the statistics (Melly, 2005). Secondly quantile regressions are also less sensitive to 
outliers, providing more robust estimators when facing non-normality and also have better 
properties than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Deaton, 1997). Accounting for 
heteroscedasticity is precisely the other main contribution of Melly’s methodology which will 
be discussed at the end of this section. Not assuming for the independence of the error term thus 
                                                   
26The method is considered semiparametric in that it is assumed the conditional quantiles satisfy a 
parametric restriction without the need of distributional assumptions; i.e. the  covariates are assumed to 
influence the whole conditional distribution (Melly, 2005) 
27 It is assumed the conditional quantiles satisfy a parametric restriction without the need to fulfil a 
distributional assumption (Salardi, 2013). 
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allows us to account for the effect of the residual in the decomposition, improving the quality of 
our results28 and adding depth to the analysis of unobservable skills (Melly, 2005). 
 
However Melly (2005, 2006) is not the only quantile regression based wage decomposition. 
Machado & Mata (2005) also developed important methods applied in the literature,  but Melly 
extends these works by solving the problem of crossing of different quantile curves and by 
determining the asymptotic distribution of the estimator (Melly, 2005). As we are using a large 
number of quantile regressions performed (as is the case in our model: one for each percentile), 
Melly’s methodology is also considered more efficient than the original Machado & Mata 
(2005). Fortin (2007) also developed a detailed quantile regression decomposition method 
which is said to improve various shortcomings of Melly (2006) and Machado & Mata (2005) 
decompositions. However it has been applied to provide a greater understanding of individual 
observable factors in the Mincer equation, not to analyze the residuals. We thus feel that for the 
purpose of this paper, where we focus on observed and unobserved human capital skills, Melly 
(2006, 2005) is more appropriate. 
 
 
Despite the advantages which Melly’s methodology provides compared to previous work, we 
are aware these methods are not without fault.  It must firstly be noted that through the 
semiparametric wage decomposition, it is not the purpose of this paper to identify causal effects 
from the factors computed in our model (Salardi, 2013).29 We are instead interested in analysing 
the joint contribution of experience and years of schooling on the wage distribution as our 
analysis focuses on the demand side of labour force inequalities. Therefore exogeneity does not 
produce biases per se but instead reduces effectiveness of the estimators. Secondly, strong 
assumptions behind quantile regressions are also maintained throughout our analysis, 
summarized in Appendix 3. Scepticisms exist as to whether the reality decompositions attempt 
to simulate actually fits all these assumptions (Fortin, Firpo & Lemieux, 2011). For this reason 
we will deal with some of the more problematic assumptions regarding our model at the end of 
this section. Thirdly we can only carry out an aggregate decomposition, however due to the 
nature of our question this is not much of a drawback. Lastly the method used is 
                                                   
28 Assuming independent error terms is correct if the error term is indeed independent and normally 
distributed.  However if the location model is unsuitable, a decomposition assuming homoscedasticy 
produces misleading results (Melly, 2005). 
29It is not possible to identify causality by means of these techniques because of lack of exogeneity of the 
independent variables in these models (which are also determined by the wage structure) and also due to  
lack of choice in the binary treatment which defines our groups of interest (in this case race) (Fortin et al. 
2011).   This last point is not so relevant in the case of Brazil:  although it is true one cannot choose their 
race, it has been proven that due to the self reporting nature of the questionnaire used, people had a 
greater propensity to describe themselves “whiter” than they really are. 
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computationally demanding, especially when carrying out Melly (2006) due having to carry out 
bootstrapping in our large dataset. For Melly (2005) we instead estimate a large number of 
quantile regressions (one for each percentile 1 to 99) and draw random variables of ߬ at random 
(Melly, 2005).  
 
Taking all advantages and shortfalls into account, this paper carries  out two types of wage 
decomposition. The first decomposition follows Melly (2006) and extends the original Machado 
& Mata (2005) model, decomposing wage differentials between white and non-white female 
workers into the effects of characteristics and coefficients at different quantiles of the wage 
distribution. This is carried separately for 2001 and 2011. The second decomposition extends 
Machado & Mata (2005) and is based on Juhn et al. (1993) by taking into account for 
heteroscedasticity. This is carried out following Melly (2005), which will add insights on how 
the residual has affected racial gaps across time. These decompositions propose estimators of 
distribution functions in the presence of covariates to simulate what the wage structure would be 
if non-white workers were rewarded according to the wage structure of white workers (Salardi, 
2013). 
5.1 The Model 
 
Following Koenker & Bassett, (1978) by means of a quantile regression framework, where {ݕ௜ ,ݔ௜}௜ୀଵே is an independent sample from a population where ݔ௜ is a K x 1 vector of regressions, 
the estimated regression for each quantile is defined as: 
 
ܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬|ݔ) = ݔ௜ߚ(߬),݂݋ݎ∀߬߳(0,1)																			(4) 
 
Theܨ௬|௫ିଵ (߬|ݔ)is the ߬௧௛ quantile of log wages per hour (ܻ) conditionally on human capital 
characteristics  (ݔ௜). Results for these equations are presented in section 6.1.  In our model we 
have only taken into account the effect of variables which proxy workers’ skills, whereݔ௜ ={ܧ݀ݑܿ,ܧ݀ݑܿଶ,ܧݔ݌,ܧݔ݌ଶ	}	30. Following Ferreira & Barros (1999) we thus assume that the 
labour market is not segmented by region, firm size, or any other attribute other than race. The 
reason for restricting the quantile regression to the most austere Mincer specification is because 
Melly’s decomposition can only account for the aggregate covariate’s effect on wages. 
Therefore, as the focus of our paper is on worker’s human capital alone, adding more factors to 
                                                   
30Different forms of this equation were tested, including proxying education with 5 dummy variables for 
education categories, or proxying experience with 13 experience categories.  All specifications yielded 
similar results, however for the purpose of comparison with previous studies and due to the shape of 
earning return functions, we settled for the quadratic specification of the Mincer Equation. 
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the explanatory variables would simply add effects onto the returns of these variables that are 
not directly associated with skills.31  
 
Under the assumption of linear relationship32, it is thus understood that ߚ௧(߬) are rates of return 
to characteristics as specified at the quantile of the conditional distribution (Melly, 2005). 
ߚ(߬)	is estimated for each ߬	by: 
 
ߚመ(߬) = arg	min௕∈ோ಼ ଵே∑ (ݕ௜ − ݔ௜ܾ)(߬ − 1(ݕ௜ ≤ ݔ௜ܾ))ே௜ୀଵ            (5) 
 
Where 1(.) is the indicator function.  
 
Asymptotically, we can estimate an infinite number of quantile regressions. In a finite sample, 
the number of numerically different quantile regressions is ܱ(݈݊݋݃(݊)), where each coefficient 
vector prevails on an interval; being (߬଴ = 0, ߬ଵ, … , ߬௃ = 1) the points where the solution 
changes. Letting	ߚመ	be	the	vector	of	all	different	quantile	regression	coefϐicients: 
ߚመ = ቀߚመ(߬ଵ), … ,ߚመ൫ ௝߬൯	, … ,ߚመ൫߬௃൯ቁ ;ߚመ൫ ௝߬൯	prevails for ௝߬ିଵto ௝߬for j=1,…,J. (Melly, 2005).	This 
is the model for the conditional quantiles of ݕ. 
 
Therefore to apply the Melly (2006) distribution, the conditional quantile function (Equation 4) 
is calculated both for whites and non-whites in each year: 
 
ݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔௐ൯ = ܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬ௐ|ݔௐ) = ݔௐ,௜ߚௐ(߬),݂݋ݎ∀߬߳(0,1)									(6) 
 
ݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔே൯ = ܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬ே|ݔே) = ݔே,௜ߚே(߬),݂݋ݎ∀߬߳(0,1)											(7) 
 
With the corresponding counterfactual regression at quantile level33: 
 
ݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔே൯ = ܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬ௐ|ݔே) = ݔே,௜ߚௐ(߬),݂݋ݎ∀߬߳(0,1)										(8) 
 
                                                   
31 However, we are aware of possible shortcomings of this specification which will be dealt with later on 
in the paper. 
32 Please refer to Appendix 3 for further explanation.  
33This procedure is thus used to simulate the counterfactual distributions for white and non-white women 
in 2001 and 2011 (Melly, 2005). Following Salardi (2013) the choice of the reference group has been 
arbitrary, making white women the base for the first two decompositions and 2001 the base for the latter 
two decompositions. The reason for choosing 2001 as the base year is because we are interested in 
isolating the effect over time of the decomposition effects, answering “what if’’  questions: what would 
have happened to wages if only the return to characteristics was set as in 2011, ceteris paribus? 
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The counterfactual represents the average wages if non-whites were paid according to the wage 
structure of whites (Salardi, 2013). 
 
The unconditional distribution is then obtained by integrating the conditional distribution 
unction over a range of covariates. Inverting the unconditional distribution function thus gives 
us the unconditional quantiles of interest (Salardi, 2013): 
 
ߠ = ܨ௒ିଵ(ߠ) = ܧ[ܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬|ݔ)(ܳఏ(ݕ|ݔ)] = නܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬|ݔ)((ܳఏ(ݕ|ݔ))݀ܨ௫(ݔ)				(9) 
 
ܨ௒
ିଵ(ߠ)is the conditional cumulative distribution of wages  and ܨ௒|௫ିଵ(߬|ݔ) is the quantile 
function.  
 
The wage gaps of the unconditional quantile functions between each racial group are thus 
denoted: 
ݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔௐ൯ − ݍො൫ߚመே , ݔே൯ = ቀݍො൫ߚመே ,ݔே൯ − ݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔே൯ቁ + ቀݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔே൯ − ݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔௐ൯ቁ				(10) 
 
This decomposition is then performed both for 2001 and 2011, the results of which are 
presented in section 6.2. 
 
In addition, performing the Melly (2005) decomposition follows the same initial procedure as 
Melly (2006). However the residual effect in Melly (2006) asymptotically disappears. This new 
decomposition adds the effect of the residual to analyzing racial wage gaps,34 which is achieved 
by separating the median coefficient effect to the residual effect following Juhn et al. (1993) 
(Salardi, 2013). 
 
Firstly the counterfactual unconditional wage distribution is constructed using estimates from 
the conditional quantile regressions based on Juhn et al. (1993) (Equation 4)35. As such, by 
taking the median as a measure of the central tendency of a distribution, the simple wage 
equation for each race: 
 
ݕ௜
௥ = ݔ௜௥ߚ௥(0.5) + ݑ௜௥ , ݎ = ܹℎ݅ݐ݁,ܰ݋݊ −ݓℎ݅ݐ݁											(11) 
 
                                                   
34 This is similar to the Machado & Mata (2005) method implemented by Albrecht, Bjorklund  & Vroman 
(2003). 
35Taking into account that the law of iterated expectations does not apply in the case of quantile 
regressions. 
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Where ߚ௧(0.5) is the coefficient vector of the median regression in race r (Melly, 2005). The 
effects of changes in characteristics ݔ, coefficients ߚ(0.5) and residual u are isolated when 
building each counterfactual as in equation (9). Thus the ߠ௧௛quantile of the counterfactual 
distribution of wages: 
 
ݍො൫ߚே ,෢ ܺௐ൯ = infቐݍ: 1ܰ ෍෍(௃
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
௝߬ − ௝߬ିଵ)1൫ݔ௜ଵଵߚே෢൫ ௝߬൯ ≤ ݍ൯ ≥ ߠቑ					(12) 
 
 
Finally, the Melly (2005) decomposition including residuals becomes can be expressed as: 
 
ݍො൫ߚመ௪ , ݔ௪൯ − ݍො൫ߚመே , ݔே൯= ቀݍො൫ߚመௐ, ݔௐ൯ − ݍො൫ߚመ௠ௐ,௥ே , ݔௐ൯ቁ + ቀݍො൫ߚመ௠ௐ,௥ே , ݔଵଵ൯ − ݍො൫ߚመே , ݔௐ൯ቁ+ ቀݍො൫ߚመே , ݔௐ൯ − ݍො൫ߚመே , ݔே൯ቁ																									(13) 
 
The first bracket represents the effect of changes in the residuals36; the second the effects of 
changes in the median coefficients and the third the effects of changes in the distribution of 
covariates (Melly, B: 2005). This decomposition is thus carried out both for white and non-
white female workers are also performed for 2001 and 2011; the results are presented in section 
6.3.  
 
5.2 Reassessing Assumptions 
 
As stated above, a drawback of quantile decomposition methods in general is that they are 
subject to strong assumptions which do not always hold in reality (Fortin et al. 2011). In our 
case, out of the assumptions explained in Appendix 3, we feel four issues in our model require 
clarifications: selectivity, monotonicity, omitted variables and heteroscedasticity 
 
                                                   
36In order to separate the effects of the coefficients from the effects of residuals, the ߬௧௛quantile of the 
residual distribution conditionally on ݔ is consistently estimated by ݔ ቀߚመ(߬) − ߚመ(0.5)ቁ.	We thus calculate 
the distribution that would have prevailed if the median return to characteristics had been the same as in 
2011 but the residual had been distributed as in 2001. 
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Firstly a major concern in the decomposition literature, which ought to be taken into account in 
our analysis, is that of selection bias. The problem with the exogeneity assumption which 
prevails in our method is that it can fail; which would lead to three possible self-selection and 
general endogeneity problems (Fortin et al. 2011): 
 
 White and non-white women present differing decision processes when entering the 
labour market. Self-selection can be based on observables, on unobservables and on 
bounds (Machado, 2011). This is a prevalent issue in the analysis of female 
participation rates, especially taking into account that only around 60% (World Bank 
Data, 2001-2011) of the female population participates in the workforce in Brazil. In 
labour models, black women have been found to be positively selected in work 
occupation, while white women appear to be negatively selected (Neal, 2004).  We 
believe this source of selectivity could be problematic, yet controlling for sample 
selection in Melly’s methodology is still being developed to date in Melly (2011). 
 
 Selection bias can also take place if the individual can decide whether to belong to 
group A or B. This, in theory, does not affect results, as technically speaking nobody 
can choose their race. However, the self-reporting nature of PNAD can lead to selection 
bias because of the often ambiguous distinction between being “mixed” and being 
“black” or “white”37.  Nevertheless, due to our binary classification of white and non-
white, we believe that our specification is less likely to  suffer from this source of bias. 
 
 General endogeneity bias could take place due to the correlation of the covariates to the 
error term. This can be corrected by means of instrumental variables and has been done 
so for the case of Brazil in recent studies (Bourgignon et al. 2004 for example). 
However in the case of quantile regressions, the validity of instruments is still under 
question. Consequently controlling for instrumental variables is beyond the scope of 
this paper and instead propose different solution: On the one hand we exclude the 
principle of exogeneity and instead adhere to the assumption of weak exogeneity, which 
does allow a degree of correlation between observables and unobservables, as long as 
this is the same for both groups (Firpo et al, 2011). On the other hand we acknowledge 
the possible effect of self-selection and endogeneity in our model. One of the most cited 
factors which affects wage inequality and the levels of skills an individual will have, not 
included in our model, is occupation  (Salardi (2013) or Soares (2000)). Despite the fact 
that the nature of our question is not based on occupation structures, we have re-run the 
                                                   
37 Due to the social stigma of being coloured, it is believed a greater number of people consider 
themselves “white” when in reality they are “mixed”, for example (SIS, 2012). 
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model controlling for occupation  in Appendix 6 to determine if there indeed is a bias in 
our results38. Comparing the results in Appendix 6 with Figures 5 and 6 thus reveals the 
robustness of our results, as the role of all effects does not vary much by adding 
occupation controls. However, and as expected, the explanatory role of the Composition 
Effect increases slightly, particularly for the lower end of the earnings spectrum. This 
means that our results present a slight upward bias in the role of the Residual Effect and 
a slight downward bias for the Composition Effect if we do not control for occupation. 
Furthermore, sample selection within the quantile framework is still problematic. 
Albrecth, van Vuuren & Vroman (2009) developed an extension to Machado & Mata 
(2005) which controls for sample selection. However in view of their similar results for 
the effect of education and experience with and without controls, together with previous 
mean decompositions for Brazil which are almost unchanged with sample selection; we 
are confident of the uncorrected findings at the quantile level. Moreover we assume 
instead weak exogeneity  
 
 
Secondly, the Monotonicity Assumption can break with measurement error in a model; meaning 
that the residual is the result of both this measurement error and unobserved skills (Firpo et al. 
2011). Consequently it is theoretically impossible to invert the conditional quantile function and 
reach Equation (9) (Salardi, 2013). We are aware of possible measurement errors in our data; 
however we follow Melly (2005), who also  commented on the possible lack of monotonicity in 
these models: Considering the following property of ݍ଴, the population’s ߠ௧௛quantile of ܻ: 
 
 
ݍ଴ = ܨ௒ିଵ(ߠ) න1(ݕ ≤ ݍ଴)݀ܨ௬(ݕ) = ߠ න൬න 1(ݕ ≤ ݍ଴) ௒݂|௑(௬|௫)ௗ௬൰݀ܨ௑(ݔ)
= ߠ	 නቆන ൫ܨ௒|௑ିଵ (߬	|ݔ) ≤ ݍ଴൯݀ఛଵ
଴
ቇ݀ܨ௑ = ߠ												(14) 
 
This problem is overcome by changing the variable of integration, noting that ఛ݂൫ ௝߬൯ = 1, 
∀ఛೕ߳(0,1).  Replacing ܨ௒|௑ିଵ ൫ ௝߬	|ݔ௝൯ by its consistent estimate ݔ௜ߚመ൫ ௝߬൯ and following the 
convention of taking the infimum of the set if the finite sample solution is not unique. The 
sample analogue of ݍ଴	is	therefore: 
                                                   
38 As stated in the data section, four controls for occupation have been introduced in our model based on 
occupational category data provided in PNAD. These variables stand for employees, self-employed, 
domestic workers and employer. Summary statistics for the occupation structure of whites and non-whites 
for both years are also presented in Appendix 6. 
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ݍො൫ߚ,෡ ݔ൯ = infቐݍ: 1ܰ ෍෍(௃
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
௝߬ − ௝߬ିଵ)1൫ݔ௜ߚመ൫ ௝߬൯ ≤ ݍ൯ ≥ ߠቑ										(15) 
 
 
Assuming traditional restrictions of the quantile regression model, one can thus prove that ݍො is a 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed estimator of ݍ଴	and overcome the problem of 
lack of monotonicity (Melly, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, following O’Neill (1990) the prevalent study of males in racial wage decompositions is 
due to the statistical bias which arises from strong changes in female labour market participation 
rates. However we argue this specification was true for the US in the 1990s, when this fact did 
indeed bias results, but it need not be so clear for Brazil today. On the one hand, the strong 
prevalence of the informal market means that only between 40-50% of the population is 
represented in formal labour market studies in Brazil (Salardi, 2013). This means that whilst 
female participation rate has indeed increased more than male participation rate, when analysing 
our data both sexes have varied composition in similar terms. We have confirmed that men’s 
participation rates overall and in our four occupation categories have varied as much as 
women’s participation rates across races. Therefore while we have dealt with possible biases 
arising from workers’ occupation composition, there is no evidence to suggest that these same 
biases would not be present for men as well. 
 
Finally by means of Melly (2005), we find that homoscedasticity is not fulfilled in our case (as 
is probably the case in many other country studies). We can prove this by running quantile 
regressions for the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles which have been plotted for 
Table 4 below39. This table provides evidence of the effect on the dispersion of wages of the 
explanatory covariates in the quantile regressions. If the error term is independent of a 
characteristic then the coefficient of its fitted value should not be significantly different from 
zero. Moreover we can also infer the effect each of the characteristics modelled has on WGI: if 
the 90th-10th centile difference is positive (negative), then a higher value increases (decreases) 
WGI (Melly, 2005). 
 
 
                                                   
39 Note that we have only reported education instead of education and education squared. This has been 
done so as not to capture the negative effect of low levels of education portrayed in Table 5. 
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Table 4. Differential Regression Results 
 
 
       Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
Consequently we show that characteristics do affect WGI, except for Experience Squared in 
three out of four cases and Education for White 2001. We can thus infer that the error term is 
not independent from the covariates and actually changes according to most explanatory 
variables in our framework. Due to this composition effect on the residual, methods which do 
not take into account the dependence between characteristics and residuals underestimate the 
effect of the former and overestimate the effect of the latter (Melly, 2005). Therefore the higher 
the level of education, the higher the variances of wages and thus the greater WGI. Experience 
follows a similar pattern until a certain value level, after which the  effect becomes insignificant 
or even negative. 
 
Part VI.  Results 
 
The results for the Melly (2005, 2006) decomposition are divided into three subsections below:  
Section 64.1 presents results for the median coefficients of the quantile regressions. Section 6.2 
summarizes the results for the Melly (2006) racial wage gap decomposition both in 2001 and 
2011. Finally section 6.3 discloses the results for the Melly (2005) decomposition. These results 
are presented on tables as well as graphs, plotting the decomposition results at 99 different 
quantiles (ߠ =0.01, 0.02, 0.03…0.99): 
White 2001 Non-white 2001 White 2011 Non-white 2011
Education 0.0412*** 0.0121*** 0.0576*** 0.0101***
(0.00378) (0.00308) (0.00345) (0.00268)
Experience 0.0203*** 0.00945*** 0.0365*** 0.0131***
(0.00260) (0.00305) (0.00317) (0.00336)
Experience Sq -5.63e-05 8.49e-06 -0.000308*** 2.42e-05
(5.39e-05) (5.43e-05) (7.11e-05) (7.22e-05)
Constant 0.982*** 1.417*** 0.412*** 1.147***
(0.0636) (0.0461) (0.0543) (0.0543)
Observations 27,059 21,998 26,709 27,114
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Differential Quantile Regression Results
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6.1 Quantile Regressions 
 
 
We have firstly plotted the results for the Koenker & Bassett (1978) quantile regressions (please 
refer to Figures 8 & 9 in Appendix 4). Furthermore we have presented below the results for the 
50th centile in Table 540. Stars indicate that results are significantly different from zero41: 
Table 5. Quantile Regression Results 
 
      Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
The coefficients of these median regressions provide evidence of how the level of wage depends 
on the explanatory variables in the quantile regressions (Melly, 2005). Otherwise the results for 
the median regressions reveal generally intuitive results taking in mind the stylized facts 
presented in previous sections.  
 
Years of study presents non-linear returns to education, negative at the smallest number of years 
of study, which then become positive the higher the years of education. Looking back at Figure 
3, for those with less than Ensino Fundamental, returns to years of study were low, quite stable 
                                                   
40Melly (2005) using Chernozhukov & Hong (2002) 3-step censored quantile regressions due to income 
top-coding on US data. However, Brazilian data is not top coded and we thus feel unnecessary when 
using PNAD data. Instead we decided to run Koenker & Basser (1978) quantile regressions as stated in 
the methodology (Velez, Barros & Ferreira, 2008).  
41 Standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping 100 times, which estimates the distribution of ߚመ(ߠ) 
consistently (Melly,  2005). 
White 2001 Non-white 2001 White 2011 Non-white 2011
Education -0.0379*** -0.0177*** -0.115*** -0.0753***
(0.00645) (0.00494) (0.00501) (0.00388)
Education Sq 0.00982*** 0.00845*** 0.0118*** 0.00901***
(0.000325) (0.000285) (0.000242) (0.000220)
Experience 0.0411*** 0.0415*** 0.0275*** 0.0233***
(0.00110) (0.00136) (0.000948) (0.000916)
Experience Sq -0.000521*** -0.000507*** -0.000337*** -0.000273***
(2.33e-05) (2.67e-05) (2.08e-05) (2.01e-05)
Constant -0.0842** -0.384*** 0.751*** 0.552***
(0.0337) (0.0264) (0.0282) (0.0228)
Observations 27,115 22,113 26,73 27,168
Median Quantile Regression Results
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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and fluctuating around a given value. This phenomenon has been previously encountered in 
wage studies for Brazil, especially in urban labour markets, where there is a strong demand for 
qualified labour. Those who do not possess at least Ensino Fundamental have thus very limited 
formal employment options and are most likely exempt from the formal labour remuneration 
structures presented in this model (Stevens & Weale, 2003). Moreover the positive squared 
value for education captures increasing returns to education for those with higher levels of 
education. Finally unsurprisingly, returns to education have increased in 2011 with respect to 
2001 and were also higher for white than for non-white sectors of the population throughout 
both years.  
 
Experience also has positive albeit diminishing returns across the two years of study for the 50th 
centile. The variable Experience Square provides very low returns compared to Experience for 
all sectors of the population in both years for example. These are smaller in 2011 than in 2001 
and also lower for White than for Non-white female workers. Furthermore higher years of 
experience, as proxied by Experience Squared, yield negative returns for all races across both 
years, which is explained by the inverted U shaped returns to education graphed in previous 
sections. This result also coincides with previous findings in the literature by Ferreira, F. & 
Barros, R. (1999), who explain the fact that from a certain age, irrespective of your experience, 
salaries no longer rise in the same proportion as when a worker is young42. 
 
Finally, results for all quantiles across the Quantile Regressions are graphically presented in 
Figures 8 & 9 of Appendix 4. These results capture differing trends across races and years 
which are not depicted in the median regression.  
 
On the one hand, Education presents and L-shaped decreasing returns to education pattern 
across quantiles for white workers in 2011 and non-white workers in 2001 and 2011. Indeed 
white workers in 2011 follow a smooth, downward sloping curve across quantiles which flattens 
out from the 70th centile onwards. However non-white workers experience a common peak in 
returns to education around the 10th centile, followed by falling wage trends between the 20th 
and 40th centiles which then smooth out until around the 90th centile.  From the 90th centile 
onwards, non-white workers earning above the 90th centile in 2001 then decrease returns 
dramatically; whilst those non-white workers located in the same wage percentile during 2011 
slightly increase. Contrasting these results, white workers in 2001 experience a different pattern 
to all other sectors, with U-shaped returns to education. For this sector of the population, the 
lowest returns to education are experienced by the 20th centile, whilst the highest returns are 
                                                   
42 It must be taken into account that Experience was built on age, so we are thus also capturing effects of 
age on its returns to experience. 
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obtained at the bottom and top of the earnings distribution. Moreover, just as in the median 
quantile regression results, returns to education are higher in 2011 than in 2001. 
 
 On the other hand, returns to experience follow quite different patterns for white and non-white 
workers. White workers experience increasing returns to experience from the 20th centile 
onwards and fluctuating returns beforehand. Whereas non-white workers present U-shaped 
returns to experience. From Figure 9 in Appendix 4 this pattern is more clearly discernible in 
2011: with the bottom peak located at the 20th centile. However in 2001, the U-shape is 
smoother across the entire wage distribution: starting at with a peak at the 20th centile and 
followed by a W shaped pattern with a slight rise around the 40th centile. Finally just as in the 
median results, returns are lower for 2011 than for 2001. 
6.2  Decomposition of Racial Wage Gap by Year 
 
In order to understand how and why racial wage gaps have decreased over time across the 
whole earnings distribution we have carried out the decomposition proposed by Melly (2006), 
developed in section V. This decomposition, which is very similar to Machado & Mata (2005), 
allows disentangling the aggregate contribution of differences in characteristics (the explained 
component) and differences in returns to those characteristics (the unexplained component or 
wage structure) on racial wage gaps by quantile (Salardi, 2013). Note that the residual 
component asymptotically disappears, whereas it is still present when we implement the 
decomposition of the unconditional quantile wage gap using the Melly (2005) (Salardi, 2013). 
Figure 5 graphically depicts the results presented in Table 1 of Appendix 5 for the Melly (2006) 
decomposition, whilst Table 6 reports the decomposition of indices of inequality for racial wage 
gaps.  
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Figure 5. Decomposition of Differences in the Distribution 
 
 2001  
 
2011 
  
 
 Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
Table 6 Decomposition of Inequality Measures  
 
 
 
The results in Figure 5 present the observed and simulated racial wage gaps across the wage 
distribution in 2001 on the left graph and in 2011 on the right graph. The most striking common 
result across both years is a U-shaped total racial differential log wage effect across earnings. 
This takes place as a result of total wage gaps being smallest at the centre compared to the ends 
of the wage distribution; these findings confirm previous findings in the literature for urban 
Brazil by Salardi (2013), Salardi (2009) and Ñopo(2012). Numerically this can be  perceived in 
Table 12, Appendix 5: in 2001 white women workers for the 10th centile on average earned 50% 
more than non-white female workers, 48% more in the 50th centile and 72% more in the 90th 
centile of the wage distribution. These effects diminish in 2011, where white women earned 
Total Change Effects of Total Change Effects of
Statistic Coefficients Charactertitics Coefficients Charactertitics
90-10 21,00 (0,018) 2,00 ( 0,019) 19,00 (0,013) 17,70 (0,059) 5,50 (0,044) 12,20 (0,043)
100% 10% 90% 100% 31% 69%
50-10 -2,00 (0,12) -7,00 (0,012) 5,00 (0,006) -4,00 (0,043) -5,00 (0,036) 1,00 (0,018)
100% 350% -250% 100% 125% -25%
90-50 24,00 (0,013) 10,00 ( 0,0167) 14,00 (0,011) 21,50 (0,041) 10,50 (0,037) 11,00 (0,04)
100% 42% 58% 100% 49% 51%
The percentage weight of each effect is presented each variable.
Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications in parenthesis.
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
2001 2011
Note: All numbers have been multiplied by 100. Negative Values in Percentage Change Reveal a Decrease in inequality measures whereas positive results reveal an  increase in 
inequality measures
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34%  more in the 10th centile, 30% more in the 50th centile and 52% more in the 90th centile. 
Moreover, despite the fact that wage differentials overall did decrease across time (Table 6 
reveals a fall in 90-10 percentile ratio from 21% to 17.70%); Figure 5 also reveals an 
apprehensively deeper U-shaped racial wage gap distribution in 2011 compared to 2001. The 
reason for this effect across time results from the greatest change in racial wage differentials 
between 2001 and 2011 being experienced across the middle of the wage distribution: as seen in 
Table 12 in Appendix 5, wage gaps for the 50th centile decreased from 48% differential to 30% 
in a decade. Conversely the smallest change occurs at the top end, where wage racial gaps 
decrease from 72% to 52%, emphasizing the maintenance of glass ceiling effects during our 
period of study. Prevalence of glass ceiling effects are also present in Table 6 by diminishing, 
albeit positive 90-50 percentile ratios:  24% and 21.50% for 2001 and 2011 respectively. It is 
the maintenance of wage differentials within the lowest 10th centile which is worrying, as it 
underscores the appearance of sticky floor effects amongst non-white working women. . As 
confirmed by Figure 5 and our decomposition results, wage inequality by race for the first three 
centiles actually does not vary across years and remains around 57% racial wage differentials. 
Likewise, Table 6 reveals the rise of sticky floor effects by means of negative 50-10 percentile 
ratios, which increase from 0.02 to 0.04 between 2001 and 2011. Following Salardi (2013), who 
discusses the existence of sticky floor effects for gender wage gaps, we believe this result is 
likely captured in our results too. We can thus infer that, despite the fact that overall inequality 
has fallen, mostly due to the reduction in the median of the distribution, black women, 
particularly at the lowest wage levels, are not benefiting as much from these improvements: a 
marginalisation of the lowest sectors, as described by Ferreira & Barros (1999).   
 
The combination of Composition and Price Effects which compile the variation of observed 
wages also follow similar previous findings in the literature. Salardi (2013) finds a strong 
Composition Effect on the total wage differential across races and a strong Price Effect on total 
wage gaps across gender. However, due to the fact that we are capturing both a gender and 
racial discrimination effect in our model, we find a combination of both these results for racial 
gaps amongst women: as seen in Table 12 of Appendix 5 characteristics in 2001 play a smaller 
role amongst lower earnings, which then becomes predominant at the top end of the wage 
distribution: Their role composes 42% of observed wage gaps for the 10th centile and 56% for 
the 90th centile in 2001. Moreover from Table 6 we can confirm that it has been the skill 
composition of workers which plays the greatest role in wage gap inequalities across the top 
half and whole wage distribution as seen in 90-50 and 90-10 percentile ratios; whilst as 
perceived from 50-10 percentile ratios, coefficients play a greater role in the lowest paid 
quantiles. Quantity and quality of education are thus important in the labour market amongst 
women, particularly at the top 50% of the distribution (Lemieux, 2006). Results which are also 
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reached by Salardi (2013) using PNAD 2006 data and Bartalotti & Leme (2007) using PNAD 
2004 data.  Notwithstanding by 2011, the value of workers’ skill composition diminish below 
the incidence of the Price Effect for both the top and bottom end of the wage spectrum. From 
Table 12 in Appendix 5, characteristics comprise 41% of total wage gaps at the 10th centile and 
48% at the 90th centile. However by 2011, coefficients become predominant at both the ends of 
the wage distribution. In Table 1 of Appendix 5 and Table 6 we can confirm the greater weight 
of coefficients in determining wage gaps and inequality measures. Consequently, the wage 
structure has been important in the development of higher sticky floor effects: In Table 6, we 
can perceive that coefficients play a much larger role in determining 50-10 percentile ratio than 
characteristics, particularly so for 2011. Taking into account that wages have a positive relation 
with education and experience in our data, we can thus confirm that discrimination in the labour 
market is indeed significant for determining wage structures across those with the lowest level 
of skills, and increasingly so for those with the highest skill level.  
 
6.3 Extended Decomposition Results 
 
In contrast with the results in section 6.2, figure 6 and Table 1 of Appendix 5 reveal the results 
for Melly (2005) decomposition. Table 7 presents the decomposed percentile ratios for wage 
gaps across the earnings distribution just as in Table 6 in the previous section. In comparison to 
Melly (2006), this method now takes into account the effects of residuals as a component to 
total wage variation. Consequently, we distinguish between the effect of the wage structure and 
returns to observed skills, as suggested by Juhn et al. (1993), Lemieux (2002) and Autor et al. 
(2005). 
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Figure 6. Results of the Melly (2005) Racial Gap Decomposition 
 
2001 2011 
  
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
 
Table 7. Decomposed Inequality Measures  
 
 
From Figure 6 and Table 12 in Appendix 5 we can discern that the Composition Effect across 
the distribution of wages remains virtually the same as in the previous section: This effect is 
prevalent in explaining wage gaps across the entire wage distribution in 2001.  The greater 
incidence of the Composition Effect on the overall wage distribution inequality (90-10 
percentile ratio) was also found by Melly (2005) and Salardi (2013). However, the Price Effect 
overtakes the Composition Effect and, by 2011, it had become prevalent in racial wage gaps for 
the top end of the earnings distribution. Residuals remain marginal during the whole period. 
From Table 12 in Appendix 5, we reveal that characteristics decrease from 55% to 47% of total 
wage gaps at the 90th centile between 2001 and 2011; whereas coefficients increase their role 
from 41% to 51%. However at the bottom end of the distribution, the role of the Composition 
and Price Effects changes with respect to Melly (2006) due to the inclusion of the Residual 
Effect. In comparison to the previous results, whilst the Price Effect was predominant at the 
lower end of the distribution in 2001 this effect reduces considerably by 2011. At the bottom 
Total Residual Coefficient Characteristics Total Residual Coefficient Characteristics
90/10 0,22 ( 0,017) -0,04 ( 0,021) 0,07 (0,016) 0,19 (0,015) 0,18 (0,018) -0,06 (0,015) 0,14 ( 0,021) 0,10 (0,016)
100% -17% 30% 87% 100% -33% 77% 56%
50/10 -0,02 (0,009) -0,08 ( 0,011) 0,01 (0,008) 0,05 ( 0,006) -0,04 (0,010) -0,09 (0,006) 0,04 ( 0,011) 0,01 (0,008)
100% 434% -54% -280% 100% 225% -100% -25%
90/50 0,24 (0,012) 0,04 (0,015) 0,06 (0,011) 0,14 (0,011) 0,22 (0,012) 0,03 ( 0,011) 0,10 ( 0,015) 0,09 (0,011)
100% 17% 24% 60% 100% 13% 43% 43%
          The percentage weight of each effect is presented each variable
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
2011
Note: Negative Values in Percentage Change Reveal a Decrease in inequality measures whereas positive results reveal an increase in inequality measures
Decomposition of Inequality Indexes
2001
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10th centile of the wage distribution, the Price Effect evolved from composing 47% of total 
wage gaps in 2001 to 37% in 2011. It has thus been a combination of the maintenance of the 
Composition Effect and rise of the Residual which have become the main effects in the growth 
of sticky floors: From Table 12 in Appendix 5 we confirm that the Composition Effect remains 
explaining 41% of total wage gaps throughout our period of study. Conversely the Residual 
Effect increases from 12% to 22%. These results contrast with Foguel & Acevedo (2006), who 
found that residuals decreased across time, for the period 2001-2005. 
 
Residuals in particular, although exerting a very modest dimension compared to the Price and 
Composition Effect, presents varying trends throughout the distribution. The Residual Effect is 
positive at the bottom and top end of the wage distribution but became negative around the 
centre of the wage distribution. In Table 12, Appendix 5, residuals present an increasing role at 
the bottom 10th centile of the wage distribution, contributing to the rise of sticky floor effects: 
from 12% to 22% of observed wage gaps as seen in Table 12 in Appendix 5. However the role 
of the Residual Effect at the median opposes that of both the Composition and Price Effects:      
-2% of racial wage gaps at the 50th centile in 2001 and -8% in 2011. These results seem to 
indicate that the Residual Effect is a component of the disproportionate fall in racial wage gaps 
during this time in the median. The strong effect of the residual on the bottom 10% of wage 
earners is also present in Table 7, where residuals amount to 434% of the total 50-10 percentile 
ratio in 2001, and to 225% in 2011. Moreover, negative and increasing values for the Residual 
Effect in 90-10 percentile ratio decomposition (from -0.04 to -0.06) would imply that this effect 
is higher across time for the 10th, comparatively to the 90th centiles, across earnings. Therefore, 
in comparison to Melly (2006), it seems that it is the Residual Effect and not the Price Effect 
which accounts for a greater part of the more pronounced U-shaped pattern across racial wage 
gaps. Differentiating between returns to observed prices and wage structure effects is indeed 
important and ought to be taken into account in future research (Melly, 2005).  
 
6.4 Robustness Checks 
 
Finally, following Melly (2005) we have carried out robustness checks for our model. Firstly, 
we have run the model with 20, 40 and 100 bootstrap replications, all of which have reached 
similar results to those reported in previous sections. Moreover, as the decomposition 
framework is sensitive to the order of explanatory variables in our model, we have run each 
decomposition again, but rearranging Education and Experience.  Results specified with 
Experience first are presented in Appendix 7 and yield identical findings to our original 
specification.  On a final note, despite the fact that our decomposition results are built on fitted 
values for log hourly wages; the robustness of our results is also perceived when comparing our 
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fitted values in Figures 5 and 6 to raw wage differentials present in the data in Figure 1. The 
bottom quantile and the top 3 deciles experienced much racial wage differences both in 2001 
and 2011 (around 40% compared to an average 23% for the middle quantiles). These middle 
quantiles also experienced the greatest decline in wage differentials compared to the ends (the 
5th quantile decreased from 37% to 25% compared much smaller changes in the tails of the 
wage distribution). Therefore, the checks performed make us confident of the results presented 
in this paper. 
 
VII Conclusion & Policy Implications 
 
Throughout this article we have analysed the reduction in women’s racial wage gaps across the 
earnings distribution, and how changes in the skill composition of the female workforce in 
urban Brazil contributed to this phenomenon between 2001 and 2011. In so doing, we have 
provided a truly original contribution by focusing on women, a gap in the literature which is 
likely to impact present and future generations (Hill & King, 2010) (Gradín, 2007)). In addition, 
we have extended wage decomposition frameworks applied to the country by using Melly 
(2005), discussing the impact of heteroscedasticy and updating wage gaps to 2011. 
 
Our results thus confirm past trends in the literature but also reveal concerning new wage gap 
patterns and their potential sources. In the course of our analysis, we have confirmed falling U-
shaped racial wage gap distributions mostly due to the fact that improvements in racial 
disparities have been greater around the median. Glass ceiling effects have fallen, but still 
prevailed between 2001 and 2011, together with the development of sticky floor effects (Please 
refer to Figures 5 & 6). Our findings coincide with previous research in the country carried out 
by Salardi (2013) and Santos & Ribeiro (2006), relative to the persistence, albeit lowering, of 
glass ceiling effects amongst women. However, the original contribution of this paper is the 
finding of growing sticky floor effects across time. By means of Melly (2005) we have 
determined them to be related to increased skills in the form of the Composition Effect and to 
unobserved economic wage structures captured in the Residual Effect. Therefore as predicted in 
the introduction, higher skill composition has indeed played strong and varying role in 
determining racial wage gaps along the distribution of female wages: 
 
On the one hand, as seen in Figure 5, Melly´s (2006) decomposition reveals that the 
Composition Effect has played a greater role at the top end of the wage distribution while the 
Price Effect has become predominant at the bottom end, in 2001. However, by 2011, the Price 
Effect became the driving force behind both glass ceilings and sticky floors (please refer to 
Table 12 in Appendix 5). We thus confirm that the soaring increase in tertiary education has 
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reduced the Composition Effect of glass ceilings. Instead, by 2011 it was the greater returns to 
education which became the major factor at the top and bottom levels of the wage distribution. 
 
On the other hand, extending our analysis to Melly (2005) reveals a different and more 
complete insight to the reasons behind changes in racial wage gaps amongst working women in 
urban Brazil (please refer to Figure 6). Whilst the Composition Effect still played a predominant 
role in glass ceiling effects in 2001; it diminished with time and became the predominant factor 
in sticky floors by 2011. Consequently, positive externalities of higher levels of education and 
experience have benefited the upper wage sectors and, conjunctionally, bypassed the lowest 
wage earners; this trend seems to be a common occurrence in Brazilian public policy, as 
perceived by Ferreira & Barros (1999). Furthermore, the delineation of returns to observed 
skills and wage structure effects in our model reveals the Residual Effect and not the Price 
Effect to have had an increasing role in sticky floor effects during our period of analysis. This is 
clear in Table 12 in Appendix 5, where the Residual Effect presents higher negative 50-10 
percentile ratios for both years: -0.08 for 2001 and -0.09 for 2011; whereas the Price Effect 
shows positive values: 0.01 in 2001n and 0.04 in 2011. In contrast to this finding, we have also 
found that the Residual Effect has also contributed to lowering wage gaps around the median of 
the wage distribution in 2011. As opposed to the Composition and Price Effects, the residuals 
present negative values around the 50th centile, accounting for -2% and -8% of the total 
variation in racial wage gaps for 2001 and 2011, respectively (please refer to Table 1 Appendix 
5). These results thus point towards the fact that certain institutional factors and unobserved 
skills are strongly benefitting female workers in the median earnings distribution, whilst at the 
same time marginalising those below the lowest earnings decile. Moreover, they also reinforce 
findings from Section III that WGI is also an important factor which determines overall wage 
inequality and should not be omitted from these types of analysis. 
 
Beyond these results, as discussed in the introduction it is not possible to directly discern what 
unobserved factors compose the Residual Effect due to the aggregate nature of our model and 
because of the heteroscedasticity of the residual inequality43. We do know however that changes 
in the skill composition of workers positively affected WGI. Therefore as revealed in Table 4, 
we can determine that greater education and experience alone made residual inequality higher; 
which contributed to greater overall racial wage inequality during this time. This partly explains 
the positive Residual Effect on sticky floors; however other factors are clearly counteracting the 
residual’s outcome across the rest of the wage distribution. Therefore by means of the 
                                                   
43 Autor et al. (2005), Lemieux (2002) and Autor et al. (2008) all propose residual decomposition 
methods based on a combination of Di Nardo et al. and Juhn et al . (1993) decomposition frameworks. 
However they rely on the unrealistic assumption of residual inequality homoscedasticity. 
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theoretical framework and empirical evidence presented in Section III, we infer possible 
explanations behind these changes: 
 
Firstly, the literature has highlighted the role of unobserved variables affecting wage dispersion 
in our model. On the one hand, by running an extended model including occupation categories, 
we confirmed that the omission of this variable is slightly downward biasing the Composition 
Effect. However, we conclude that this difference is not very significant, as our results have 
remained almost identical across both models (see Figure 3 in Appendix 6, and Figures 5 & 6). 
On the other hand, unobserved variables in terms of family background or school quality could 
also be affecting our results. Bourguignon et al. (2004) and Ferreira, (2000) have highlighted 
the role of parent’s education and quality of schooling as major explanatory factors for wage 
inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution. Following this evidence, we assume that these 
unobserved factors are very likely to be impacting on our results for the Residual Effect. 
 
Secondly, the literature has highlighted the important effect of institutional factors in the 
Residual Effect, particularly concerning six issues: antidiscrimination institutions, minimum 
wage, trade unions, open trade, skill biased technological change and economic growth 
(Lemieux, 2006). It has previously been outlined that the very low trade union membership, the 
limited trade policy variations, patterns of returns to education in Figure 3 and the 
unresponsiveness of wage structures to short-run economic changes (Pavcnik et al (2002) and 
Arbache (2001)); render trade unions, trade liberalization, skill-biased technological change and 
economic growth marginal explanations for the patterns of the Residual Effect. However, the 
important institutional changes undertaken to tackle discrimination in the Brazilian labour 
market, with the creation of organizations such as SEPPIR or the instalment of university 
quotas, are most likely having a strong effect on wage gaps and skill differentials. This is 
particularly true at the top end of the earnings distribution, as university students have been 
targeted by these policies (Fredman, 2012). Moreover, the increase in minimum wage during 
our period of study has surely had a powerful impact across the middle and bottom of the wage 
distribution(ILO, 2012). In Table 11, Appendix 2, we reveal that the first decile of white 
workers and the first two deciles of non-white workers earn below the minimum wage and are 
thus marginalised from its effect. Minimum wage increases can thus explain why the bottom 
10% of workers are being left out of wage gap improvements, but those located in the centre of 
the distribution have disproportionately improved.   
 
Thirdly there may also be some measurement error in our data. As noted in section V, PNAD is 
not without fault because of the self-reporting nature of many questions, the lack of panel data 
and the sample selection bias due to 50% informality (Da Mata et al. 2001). However, to date 
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there is no other database as complete as PNAD, and these same shortcomings are faced by all 
micro-data based studies (Deaton, 1997). 
 
All things considered, in answer to our original question we confirm that the increase in 
workers’ skills has indeed positively contributed to lower wage gaps at the top and middle of 
the wage distribution between 2001 and 2011. However, it has also had a negative effect 
amongst the lowest wage earners in the female workforce with the rise of sticky floor effects. 
Contrastingly, changing returns to education have also played an important role in the lowering 
of racial wage gaps around the median of the wage distribution. Although they have had a 
predominant effect in the maintenance of glass ceiling effects by 2011. Together with greater 
education, we have highlighted unobserved skills, minimum wage and antidiscrimination 
measures as the most likely unobserved effects prevailing in sticky floors. Therefore although 
wage gaps have overall decreased, the prevalence of glass ceilings and the growth of sticky 
floors render the racial differential distribution more heterogeneous. Policy implications for 
these results highlight first and foremost the need to target the workforce located at the lowest 
levels of earnings. Moreover there must be further work towards reducing the large informal 
market in the country which marginalizes its workers from any positive labour policy 
developments. Finally, glass ceiling effects must continue to be reduced by means not only of 
higher skill levels but also by changes in the remuneration structure for those skills. 
Government controls of these returns to skill could promote a more equal payment structure 
both for white and non-white workers. Future research ought to engage with the factors that we 
have suggested to be behind these changes in racial wage gaps, and also further control for 
sample selection and omitted variable bias. This will provide a more accurate and complete 
understanding of what determines wage discrimination for women in the workforce.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Summary Statistics by Quantile 
 
Table 8. Average Age per Quantile 
 
 
Table 9. Average Years of Study per Quantile 
 
Table 10. Average Years of Experience per Quantile 
 
 
Quantile White 2001 Nonwhite2001 White 2011 Non White 2011 Racial Difference 2001 Racial Difference 2011
1 33.09 30.89 36.83 35.28 7% 4%
2 33.15 32.31 35.12 35.99 3% -2%
3 33.50 32.92 34.78 34.49 2% 1%
4 33.41 33.15 34.93 35.68 1% -2%
5 33.94 34.37 35.47 34.7 -1% 2%
6 34.38 34.39 36.32 35.50 0% 2%
7 35.29 34.86 37.12 36.04 1% 3%
8 36.15 35.56 38126 37194 2% 2%
9 38.22 36.65 39.68 38.81 4% 2%
Note: Brasilia is exlcluded from the sample. 
          Base year for real wages: 2005
          1R$=$0,5
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
Average Age per Quantile
Quantile White 2001 Nonwhite2001 White 2011 Non White 2011 Racial Difference 2001 Racial Difference 2011
1 6.68 5.44 8.41 7.19 19% 15%
2 7.84 6.13 9.69 8.33 22% 14%
3 8.29 6.64 10.01 9.09 20% 9%
4 8.86 7.31 10.42 9.59 17% 8%
5 9.26 7.59 10.69 9.58 18% 10%
6 10.09 8.00 11.42 9.96 21% 13%
7 10.87 8.57 12.09 10.32 21% 15%
8 12.06 9.16 13.32 11.12 24% 17%
9 13.38 10.2 14.22 12.21 24% 14%
Note: Brasilia is exlcluded from the sample. 
          Base year for real wages: 2005
          1R$=$0,5
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
Average Years of study per Quantile
Quantile White 2001 Nonwhite2001 White 2011 Non White 2011 Racial Difference 2001 Racial Difference 2011
1 20.46 19.46 22.41 22.09 -5% -1%
2 18.96 20.17 19.43 21.69 6% 12%
3 19.21 20.28 18.77 19.4 6% 3%
4 18.55 19.84 18.52 20.09 7% 8%
5 18.67 20.77 18.78 19.12 11% 2%
6 18.30 20.39 18.91 19.54 12% 3%
7 18.42 20.29 19.03 19.71 10% 4%
8 18.09 20.41 18.81 20.07 13% 7%
9 18.85 20.46 19.46 20.60 9% 6%
Note: Brasilia is exlcluded from the sample. 
          Base year for real wages: 2005
          1R$=$0,5
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
Average Experience per Quantile
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Appendix 2 . Summary Statistics for Institutional Factors 
 
Table 11. Average Real Monthly Wages by Quantile 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Union Membership by Racial Group & Year 
 
 
Quantile White 2001 Non-white2001 White 2011 Non-white 2011
1 171.43 100.00 298.50 149.25
2 257.14 142.86 406.71 298.51
3 314.29 257.14 447.76 406.72
4 394.29 257.14 522.39 406.72
5 471.43 285.71 597.01 447.76
6 571.43 357.14 746.27 522.39
7 714.29 428.57 895.52 597.01
8 1071.42 542.86 1208.96 746.27
9 1714.29 800 2089.55 1119.40
Note: Red lines delimit where the minimum wage earners are located.
Brasilia is exlcluded from the sample. 
          Base year for real wages: 2005.
          1R$=$0,5
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011.
Average Real Monthly Wage by Quantile
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Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
Appendix 3. Assumptions of the Quantile Regression Based Decompositions 
 
1. Mutually exclusive groups: The population under study must be divided into two 
mutually exclusive groups: A and B, where for an agent i ܦ஺௜ + ܦ஻௜ = 1 and ܦ௚௜ =1{݅	݅ݏ	݅݊	݃},݃ = ܣ,ܤ	ܽ݊݀	1{∙} 
2. Partial Equilibrium: prices and quantities can be treated as independent 
3. Structural Form: each worker i belonging to either group A or B is paid according to 
the wge structure of each group: ݉஺ or ݉஻. These wage structures are functions of 
workers’ observable characteristics (ݔ) and unobservable characteristics (e): 
஺ܻ௜ = ݉஺(ܺ௜ ,݁௜) and ஻ܻ௜ = ݉஻(ܺ௜ , ݁௜) 
This means that there are only three possible reasons for this assumption to hold: 
differences in the wage functions of A and B, differences in the distribution of 
observable characteristics (ݔ)  across each group and differences in the distribution of 
unobservable characteristics (e) across each group. 
4. Simple Counterfactual Treatment: A counterfactual wage structure (݉௖)is assumed to 
be a simple counterfactual when ݉௖(. . ) ≡ ݉஺(. . )for workers in group B, or ݉௖(. . ) ≡
݉஻(. . ) for workers in group A. 
5. Overlapping Support: the support for all wage setting factors [ܺᇱ, ߝᇱ]′is ܺ × ߝ. For all [ݔᇱ , ݁ᇱ]ᇱin ܺ × ߝ, 0 < Pr[ܦ஻ = 1|ܺ = ݔ, ߝ = ݁] < 1.	Therefore, no value of ܺ = ݔ, ߝ =
݁ can identify workers into one group or another. 
6. Conditional Ignorability/Indepdence/Exogeneity: The distribution of wages, conditional 
on ܺ depends on the conditional distribution of ߝ, and the wage structure ݉௚(∙).	This is 
to say for ݃ = ܣ,ܤ,ℎܽݒ݅݊݃	൫ܦ௚ ,ܺ, ߝ൯ܽ	݆݋݅݊ݐ	݀݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊. For all ݔ in ܺ, ߝ  is 
independent on ܦ௚given ܺ = ݔ. This the same as assuming:  ܦ௚⊥ߝ|ܺ .  As we do not 
fulfill this assmption, we instead assume weak ignorabilit/exogeneity where 
unoservables are not independent of the mean X, however their conditional distribution 
on ܺ is assumed to be the same for both groups. 
 
7. Invariance of the Conditional Distributions: The conditional wage distribution 
ܨ௒ಲ|௑,஽ಲ(ݕ|ܺ = ݔ) can be extrapolated for ݔ	߳	ܺ, therefore it remains valid when the 
marginal distribution of ܨ௑|஽ಳ replaces ܨ௑|஽ಲ . 
8. Strict Monotoniciy in the Randome Scalar	ߝ:	For g=A,B and for all values of ݔ in X, ߝ  
is  a scalar random variable and ݉௚(ܺ, ߝ) is strictly increasing in ߝ. 
 
Assumption for Functional form restrictions applied to more general 
decompositions 
 
9. Constant Returns to Unobservables: For g=A,B, ݒ௚ = ߪ௚ߝ. 
10. Homoskedasticity: For g=A,B, Var[ߝหܺ,ܦ௚ = 1൧ = 1. 
11. Conditional Rank Preservation: The rank for workers in both groups are distributed 
equally conditionally on explanatory variables. For all indivual i, there is ߬஺௜(ݔ௜) =
߬஻௜(ݔ௜), where	߬஺௜(ݔ௜) = ܨ௩ಲ|೉(ݒ஺௜|ܺ = ݔ௜) and 	߬஻௜(ݔ௜) = ܨ௩ಳ|೉(ݒ஻௜|ܺ = ݔ௜) are the 
rankings of ݒ஺௜ and ݒ஻௜ in their conditional distributions. 
12. Heterogeneous Returns to Observables: For g=A,B, ௚ܻ௜ = ܺ௜ߚ௚,ఛ + ℎ௚,ఛ(ߝ௜). 
13. Linear Relationship: As in the OLS framework, we assume a linear relationship 
between the quantiles of y and x.  
14. Complete Collection of Linear Conditional Quantiles: For g=A,B, and∀∈ (0,1)߬ =Pr൫ ௚ܻ ≤ ݔߚ௚,ఛหܺ = ݔ,ܦ௚ = 1൯. 
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(Fortin, et al. 2011 ch2) 
 
Appendix 4. Quantile Regression Results 
  
Figure 8. Quantile Regression Results for Education 
 
 
White 2001 White 2011 
  
Non-white 2001 Non-White 2011 
  
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
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Figure 9. Quantile Regression Results for Experience 
White 2001 White 2011 
 
 
Non-white 2001 Non-white 2011 
  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
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Appendix 5. Decomposition Results 
 
Table 12. Decomposition Results  
 
 
 
Appendix 6. Model Results Including Occupation 
6.1 Summary Statistics for Occupational Categories for Women 
 
Figure 10. Occupation Composition for White Female Workers 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011  
 
0,10 0,50 0,90 0,10 0,50 0,90
Total Variation 0,50 (0 ,007) 0,48 (0,005) 0,72 (0,012) 0,34 (0,007) 0,30 (0,005) 0,52 (0,012)
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Characteristics 0,21 (0,009) 0,26 (0,007) 0,40 (0,018) 0,14 (0,008) 0,15 (0,006) 0,25 (0,012)
42% 54% 56% 41% 50% 48%
Coefficients 0,29 (0,011) 0,22 (0,007) 0,32 (0,013) 0,20 (0,011) 0,15 (0,004) 0,27 (0,011)
58% 46% 44% 59% 50% 52%
Total Variation 0,50 (0,015) 0,48 (0,009) 0,72 (0,017) 0,34 (0,013) 0,30 (0,007) 0,52 (0,017)
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Characteristics 0,20 (0,006) 0,25 (0,007) 0,39 (0,012) 0,14 (0,007) 0,16 (0,005) 0,25 (0,008)
41% 53% 55% 41% 52% 47%
Coefficient 0,23 (0,008) 0,23 (0,008) 0,29 (0,015) 0,12 (0,007) 0,17 (0,006) 0,27 (0,013)
47% 49% 41% 37% 56% 51%
Residual 0,06 (0,010) -0,01 (0,005) 0,02 (0,011) 0,08 (0,009) -0,02 (0,005) 0,01 (0,011)
12% -2% 3% 22% -8% 2%
         The percentage weight of every decomposition is presented below each value.
Source: Authors calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011
Melly (2006) Decomposition
Racial Wage Differentials By Quantile
Melly (2005) Decomposition
Note:Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications in parenthesis.
20112001
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Figure 11. Occupation Composition for Non-white Female Workers 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
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6.2 Decomposition Results  
 
Figure 12. Decompositions Results Including Occupational Categories  
 
Melly 2006 
 2001  2011 
  
 
 
Melly 2005 
2001 2011 
  
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
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Appendix 7. Robustness Checks 
 
Figure  13. Decompositions with Variable Experience First 
 
Melly 2006 
 2001  2011 
 
 
 
Melly 2005 
2001 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations from PNAD 2001 & 2011 
 
 
 
 
